Trump v. United States (2024)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 603 U. S. Part 1 Pages 593–706 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT July 1, 2024 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors. OCTOBER TERM, 2023 593 Syllabus TRUMP v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 23–939. Argued April 25, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024 A federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certify- ing of the election results. Trump moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the outer perimeter of his offcial responsibilities, and that the indictment's allegations fell within the core of his offcial duties. The District Court denied Trump's motion to dismiss, holding that former Presidents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts. The D. C. Circuit affrmed. Both the District Court and the D. C. Circuit declined to de- Page Proof Pending Publication cide whether the indicted conduct involved offcial acts. Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclu- sive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his offcial acts. There is no immu- nity for unoffcial acts. Pp. 605–642. (a) This case is the frst criminal prosecution in our Nation's history of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency. Deter- mining whether and under what circumstances such a prosecution may proceed requires careful assessment of the scope of Presidential power under the Constitution. The nature of that power requires that a for- mer President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for offcial acts during his tenure in offce. At least with respect to the President's exercise of his core constitutional powers, this immunity must be abso- lute. As for his remaining offcial actions, he is entitled to at least pre- sumptive immunity. Pp. 605–616. (1) Article II of the Constitution vests “executive Power” in “a President of the United States of America.” § 1, cl. 1. The President has duties of “unrivaled gravity and breadth.” Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800 . His authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown Sheet & 594 TRUMP v. UNITED STATES Syllabus Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585 . In the latter case, the Presi- dent's authority is sometimes “conclusive and preclusive.” Id., at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). When the President exercises such authority, Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President's ac- tions. It follows that an Act of Congress—either a specifc one targeted at the President or a generally applicable one—may not criminalize the President's actions within his exclusive constitutional power. Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines such Presidential actions. The Court thus concludes that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his ex- clusive sphere of constitutional authority. Pp. 607–609. (2) Not all of the President's offcial acts fall within his “conclusive and preclusive” authority. The reasons that justify the President's ab- solute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the scope of his exclusive constitutional authority do not extend to conduct in areas where his authority is shared with Congress. To determine the Presi- dent's immunity in this context, the Court looks primarily to the Fram- ers' design of the Presidency within the separation of powers, precedent on Presidential immunity in the civil context, and criminal cases where a President resisted prosecutorial demands for documents. Pp. 609–610. (i) The Framers designed the Presidency to provide for a “vigor- Page Proof Pending Publication ous” and “energetic” Executive. The Federalist No. 70, pp. 471–472 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). They vested the President with “super- visory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 750 . Appreciating the “unique risks” that arise when the President's energies are diverted by proceed- ings that might render him “unduly cautious in the discharge of his offcial duties,” the Court has recognized Presidential immunities and privileges “rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history.” Id., at 749, 751, 752, n. 32 . In Fitzgerald, for instance, the Court concluded that a former President is entitled to absolute immunity from “damages liability for acts within the `outer perimeter' of his offcial responsibility.” Id., at 756 . The Court's “dominant concern” was to avoid “diversion of the President's attention during the decisionmaking process caused by needless worry as to the possibility of damages actions stemming from any particular offcial decision.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 694, n. 19 . By contrast, when prosecutors have sought evidence from the Presi- dent, the Court has consistently rejected Presidential claims of absolute immunity. During the treason trial of former Vice President Aaron Burr, for instance, Chief Justice Marshall rejected President Thomas Jefferson's claim that the President could not be subjected to a sub- poena. Marshall simultaneously recognized, however, the existence of Cite as: 603 U. S. 593 (2024) 595 Syllabus a “privilege” to withhold certain “offcial paper[s].” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,694) (CC Va.). And when a subpoena issued to President Richard Nixon, the Court rejected his claim of “ab- solute privilege.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703 . But rec- ognizing “the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking,” it held that a “presump- tive privilege” protects Presidential communications. Id., at 708 . Be- cause that privilege “relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers,” id., at 711 , the Court deemed it “fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution,” id., at 708 . Pp. 610–613. (ii) Criminally prosecuting a President for offcial conduct un- doubtedly poses a far greater threat of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch than simply seeking evidence in his possession. The danger is greater than what led the Court to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from civil damages liability—that the President would be chilled from taking the “bold and unhesitating ac- tion” required of an independent Executive. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 745 . Although the President might be exposed to fewer criminal prose- cutions than civil damages suits, the threat of trial, judgment, and im- prisonment is a far greater deterrent and plainly more likely to distort Page Proof Pending Publication Presidential decisionmaking than the potential payment of civil dam- ages. The hesitation to execute the duties of his offce fearlessly and fairly that might result when a President is making decisions under “a pall of potential prosecution,” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 575 , raises “unique risks to the effective functioning of government,” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 751 . But there is also a compelling “public interest in fair and effective law enforcement.” Vance, 591 U. S., at 808 . Taking into account these competing considerations, the Court con- cludes that the separation of powers principles explicated in the Court's precedent necessitate at least a presumptive immunity from criminal prosecution for a President's acts within the outer perimeter of his off- cial responsibility. Such an immunity is required to safeguard the inde- pendence and effective functioning of the Executive Branch, and to en- able the President to carry out his constitutional duties without undue caution. At a minimum, the President must be immune from prosecu- tion for an offcial act unless the Government can show that applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no “dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754 . Pp. 613–615. (3) As for a President's unoffcial acts, there is no immunity. Al- though Presidential immunity is required for offcial actions to ensure that the President's decisionmaking is not distorted by the threat of 596 TRUMP v. UNITED STATES Syllabus future litigation stemming from those actions, that concern does not support immunity for unoffcial conduct. Clinton, 520 U. S., at 694 , and n. 19. The separation of powers does not bar a prosecution predi- cated on the President's unoffcial acts. Pp. 615–616. (b) The frst step in deciding whether a former President is entitled to immunity from a particular prosecution is to distinguish his offcial from unoffcial actions. In this case, no court thus far has drawn that distinction, in general or with respect to the conduct alleged in particu- lar. It is therefore incumbent upon the Court to be mindful that it is “a court of fnal review and not frst view.” Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U. S. 189, 201 . Critical threshold issues in this case are how to differen- tiate between a President's offcial and unoffcial actions, and how to do so with respect to the indictment's extensive and detailed allegations covering a broad range of conduct. The Court offers guidance on those issues. Pp. 616–632. (1) When the President acts pursuant to “constitutional and statu- tory authority,” he takes offcial action to perform the functions of his offce. Fitzgerald, 456 U. S., at 757. Determining whether an action is covered by immunity thus begins with assessing the President's author- ity to take that action. But the breadth of the President's “discretion- ary responsibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United Page Proof Pending Publication States frequently makes it “diffcult to determine which of [his] innu- merable `functions' encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. The immunity the Court has recognized therefore extends to the “outer pe- rimeter” of the President's offcial responsibilities, covering actions so long as they are “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC). In dividing offcial from unoffcial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President's motives. Such a “highly intrusive” inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of offcial conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 756 . Nor may courts deem an action unoffcial merely be- cause it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. Otherwise, Presi- dents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that an action was un- lawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect. Ibid. Pp. 617–619. (2) With the above principles in mind, the Court turns to the con- duct alleged in the indictment. Certain allegations—such as those in- volving Trump's discussions with the Acting Attorney General—are readily categorized in light of the nature of the President's offcial rela- tionship to the offce held by that individual. Other allegations—such as those involving Trump's interactions with the Vice President, state offcials, and certain private parties, and his comments to the general public—present more diffcult questions. Pp. 619–630. Cite as: 603 U. S. 593 (2024) 597 Syllabus (i) The indictment alleges that as part of their conspiracy to over- turn the legitimate results of the 2020 Presidential election, Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to leverage the Justice Department's power and authority to convince certain States to replace their legiti- mate electors with Trump's fraudulent slates of electors. According to the indictment, Trump met with the Acting Attorney General and other senior Justice Department and White House offcials to discuss investi- gating purported election fraud and sending a letter from the Depart- ment to those States regarding such fraud. The indictment further al- leges that after the Acting Attorney General resisted Trump's requests, Trump repeatedly threatened to replace him. The Government does not dispute that the indictment's allegations regarding the Justice Department involve Trump's use of offcial power. The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump's “conclusive and preclu- sive” authority. The Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693 . And the President's “management of the Executive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power . . . to remove the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney General— “in their most important duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 750 . The Page Proof Pending Publication indictment's allegations that the requested investigations were shams or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President of ex- clusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice Department and its offcials. Because the President can- not be prosecuted for conduct within his exclusive constitutional author- ity, Trump is absolutely immune from prosecution for the alleged con- duct involving his discussions with Justice Department offcials. Pp. 619–621. (ii) The indictment next alleges that Trump and his co- conspirators “attempted to enlist the Vice President to use his ceremo- nial role at the January 6 certifcation proceeding to fraudulently alter the election results.” App. 187, Indictment ¶10(d). In particular, the indictment alleges several conversations in which Trump pressured the Vice President to reject States' legitimate electoral votes or send them back to state legislatures for review. Whenever the President and Vice President discuss their offcial re- sponsibilities, they engage in offcial conduct. Presiding over the Janu- ary 6 certifcation proceeding at which Members of Congress count the electoral votes is a constitutional and statutory duty of the Vice Presi- dent. Art. II, § 1, cl. 3; Amdt. 12; 3 U. S. C. § 15 . The indictment's alle- gations that Trump attempted to pressure the Vice President to take particular acts in connection with his role at the certifcation proceeding 598 TRUMP v. UNITED STATES Syllabus thus involve offcial conduct, and Trump is at least presumptively im- mune from prosecution for such conduct. The question then becomes whether that presumption of immunity is rebutted under the circumstances. It is the Government's burden to rebut the presumption of immunity. The Court therefore remands to the District Court to assess in the frst instance whether a prosecution involving Trump's alleged attempts to infuence the Vice President's oversight of the certifcation proceeding would pose any dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch. Pp. 621–625. (iii) The indictment's remaining allegations involve Trump's in- teractions with persons outside the Executive Branch: state offcials, private parties, and the general public. In particular, the indictment alleges that Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to convince cer- tain state offcials that election fraud had tainted the popular vote count in their States, and thus electoral votes for Trump's opponent needed to be changed to electoral votes for Trump. After Trump failed to convince those offcials to alter their state processes, he and his co-conspirators al- legedly developed and effectuated a plan to submit fraudulent slates of Presidential electors to obstruct the certifcation proceeding. On Trump's view, the alleged conduct qualifes as offcial because it was Page Proof Pending Publication undertaken to ensure the integrity and proper administration of the federal election. As the Government sees it, however, Trump can point to no plausible source of authority enabling the President to take such ac- tions. Determining whose characterization may be correct, and with re- spect to which conduct, requires a fact-specifc analysis of the indictment's extensive and interrelated allegations. The Court accordingly remands to the District Court to determine in the frst instance whether Trump's conduct in this area qualifes as offcial or unoffcial. Pp. 625–628. (iv) The indictment also contains various allegations regarding Trump's conduct in connection with the events of January 6 itself. The alleged conduct largely consists of Trump's communications in the form of Tweets and a public address. The President possesses “extraordi- nary power to speak to his fellow citizens and on their behalf.” Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 701 . So most of a President's public communi- cations are likely to fall comfortably within the outer perimeter of his offcial responsibilities. There may, however, be contexts in which the President speaks in an unoffcial capacity—perhaps as a candidate for offce or party leader. To the extent that may be the case, objective analysis of “content, form, and context” will necessarily inform the in- quiry. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. 443, 453 . Whether the communica- tions alleged in the indictment involve offcial conduct may depend on the content and context of each. This necessarily factbound analysis is Cite as: 603 U. S. 593 (2024) 599 Syllabus best performed initially by the District Court. The Court therefore remands to the District Court to determine in the frst instance whether this alleged conduct is offcial or unoffcial. Pp. 628–630. (3) Presidents cannot be indicted based on conduct for which they are immune from prosecution. On remand, the District Court must carefully analyze the indictment's remaining allegations to determine whether they too involve conduct for which a President must be immune from prosecution. And the parties and the District Court must ensure that suffcient allegations support the indictment's charges without such conduct. Testimony or private records of the President or his advisers probing such conduct may not be admitted as evidence at trial. Pp. 630–632. (c) Trump asserts a far broader immunity than the limited one the Court recognizes, contending that the indictment must be dismissed be- cause the Impeachment Judgment Clause requires that impeachment and Senate conviction precede a President's criminal prosecution. But the text of the Clause does not address whether and on what conduct a President may be prosecuted if he was never impeached and convicted. See Art. I, § 3, cl. 7. Historical evidence likewise lends little support to Trump's position. The Federalist Papers on which Trump relies con- cerned the checks available against a sitting President; they did not Page Proof Pending Publication endorse or even consider whether the Impeachment Judgment Clause immunizes a former President from prosecution. Transforming the po- litical process of impeachment into a necessary step in the enforcement of criminal law fnds little support in the text of the Constitution or the structure of the Nation's Government. Pp. 632–634. (d) The Government takes a similarly broad view, contending that the President enjoys no immunity from criminal prosecution for any action. On its view, as-applied challenges in the course of the trial suffce to protect Article II interests, and review of a district court's decisions on such challenges should be deferred until after trial. But questions about whether the President may be held liable for particular actions, consistent with the separation of powers, must be addressed at the out- set of a proceeding. Even if the President were ultimately not found liable for certain offcial actions, the possibility of an extended proceed- ing alone may render him “unduly cautious in the discharge of his offcial duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 752, n. 32 . The Constitution does not tolerate such impediments to “the effective functioning of government.” Id., at 751 . Pp. 634–637. (e) This case poses a question of lasting signifcance: When may a former President be prosecuted for offcial acts taken during his Presi- dency? In answering that question, unlike the political branches and the public at large, the Court cannot afford to fxate exclusively, or even 600 TRUMP v. UNITED STATES Syllabus primarily, on present exigencies. Enduring separation of powers prin- ciples guide our decision in this case. The President enjoys no immu- nity for his unoffcial acts, and not everything the President does is offcial. The President is not above the law. But under our system of separated powers, the President may not be prosecuted for exercising his core constitutional powers, and he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for his offcial acts. That immunity applies equally to all occupants of the Oval Offce. Pp. 641–642. 91 F. 4th 1173 , vacated and remanded. Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined in full, and in which Bar- rett, J., joined except as to Part III–C. Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 643. Barrett, J., fled an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 650. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined, post, p. 657. Jackson, J., fled a dissenting opin- ion, post, p. 686. D. John Sauer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were William O. Scharf, Michael E. Talent, Kenneth C. Capps, John F. Lauro, and Gregory M. Singer. Page Proof Pending Publication Michael R. Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Jack L. Smith, J. P. Cooney, and James I. Pearce.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ala- bama et al. by Steve Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Robert M. Overing, Deputy Solicitor Gen- eral, and Dylan Mauldin, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attor- neys General for their respective States as follows: Ashley Moody of Flor- ida, Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Mon- tana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew Wrigley of North Dakota, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Andrew J. Ekonomou, Jane Serene Raskin, Walter M. Weber, and Benja- min P. Sisney; for the Christian Family Coalition (CFC) Florida, Inc., by Dennis Grossman; for the Coolidge Reagan Foundation et al. by Dan Backer; for the Kansas Republican Party by Craig L. Uhrich; for the Cite as: 603 U. S. 593 (2024) 601 Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the federal indictment of a former Pres- ident of the United States for conduct alleged to involve off- United States Justice Foundation et al. by Chad D. Morgan and James V. Lacy; for Sen. Steve Daines et al. by Jonathan P. Lienhard, Andrew B. Pardue, Andrew D. Watkins, and Jessica Furst Johnson; and for Sen. Roger Marshall et al. by Judd E. Stone II, Ari Cuenin, Gene P. Hamilton, and Daniel Epstein. Briefs of amici curiae urging vacatur were fled for Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III et al. by Gene C. Schaerr, Michael Boos, and Daniel H. Jorjani; and for Three Former Senior Military Offcers et al. by H. Christopher Bartolomucci, Pamela Jo Bondi, Jessica Hart Steinmann, and Michael D. Berry. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by David D. Cole, Brett Max Kaufman, Cecil- lia D. Wang, Scott Michelman, and Arthur B. Spitzer; for the Citizens Equal Rights Foundation by Lawrence A. Kogan; for Citizens for Respon- sibility and Ethics in Washington by Jonathan Maier, Nikhel Sus, Donald Page Proof Pending Publication K. Sherman, and Noah Bookbinder; for Former Government Offcials et al. by Seth P. Waxman, Todd C. Zubler, Colleen M. Campbell, Nathan- iel W. Reisinger, Fred Wertheimer, and Matthew A. Seligman; for the Leadership Now Project by P. Benjamin Duke; for Public Citizen by Scott L. Nelson and Allison M. Zieve; for Retired Four-Star Admirals et al. by Kathleen R. Hartnett, Adam Gershenson, Mikhaila Fogel, and Maureen Alger; for Scholars of Constitutional Law by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Bri- anne J. Gorod; for Scholars of the Founding Era by Lawrence S. Robbins, Katherine L. Pringle, and Thomas P. Wolf; for Jeremy Bates, pro se; for John Danforth et al. by Richard D. Bernstein, pro se; for G. Antaeus B. Edelsohn by Joan Deborah B. Edelsohn; for Martin S. Lederman, pro se; and for Stephen R. McAllister et al. by Erik S. Jaffe. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the State of Ohio et al. by Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, and Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General of Alaska, and Bridget Hill, Attorney General of Wyoming; for America's Future et al. by Wil- liam J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Robert J. Olson, John I. Harris III, Phillip L. Jauregui, and Patrick M. McSweeney; for Common Cause by Gregory L. Diskant, Jonah Knobler, and Kathay Feng; for Condemned USA by George T. Pallas; for Former U. S. Attorney General John D. Ashcroft et al. by Mark F. (Thor) Hearne II and Stephen S. Davis; for Former White House Chief of Staff Mark R. Meadows by George J. Terwil- 602 TRUMP v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court cial acts during his tenure in offce. We consider the scope of a President's immunity from criminal prosecution. I From January 2017 until January 2021, Donald J. Trump served as President of the United States. On August 1, 2023, a federal grand jury indicted him on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to ob- struct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the election results. According to the indictment, Trump advanced his goal through five primary means. First, he and his co- conspirators “used knowingly false claims of election fraud to get state legislators and election offcials to . . . change elec- Page Proof Pending Publication toral votes for [Trump's] opponent, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to electoral votes for [Trump].” App. 185, Indictment ¶10(a). Second, Trump and his co-conspirators “organized fraudulent slates of electors in seven targeted states” and “caused these fraudulent electors to transmit their false certifcates to the Vice President and other government offcials to be counted at the certifcation proceeding on January 6.” Id., at 186, ¶10(b). Third, Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to use the Justice Department “to conduct sham election crime investigations and to send a letter to the targeted states that falsely claimed that the Justice Department had identifed signifcant concerns that may have impacted the election out- liger III, John S. Moran, and Michael L. Francisco; for the Guardian Defense Fund, Inc., by George R. Wentz, Jr., Allen J. Shoff, and Mauricio Cardona; for the Puerto Rico House of Representatives by Emil Rodríguez Escudero and Jorge Martínez Luciano; for David Boyle, pro se; for Claire Finkelstein et al. by Richard W. Painter, pro se; for Gavin M. Wax et al. by Edward Andrew Paltzik and Serge Krimnus; and for Mat- thew D. Wilson, pro se. Cite as: 603 U. S. 593 (2024) 603 Opinion of the Court come.” Id., at 186–187, ¶10(c). Fourth, Trump and his co- conspirators attempted to persuade “the Vice President to use his ceremonial role at the January 6 certifcation pro- ceeding to fraudulently alter the election results.” Id., at 187, ¶10(d). And when that failed, on the morning of Janu- ary 6, they “repeated knowingly false claims of election fraud to gathered supporters, falsely told them that the Vice Presi- dent had the authority to and might alter the election re- sults, and directed them to the Capitol to obstruct the certi- fcation proceeding.” Ibid. Fifth, when “a large and angry crowd . . . violently attacked the Capitol and halted the pro- ceeding,” Trump and his co-conspirators “exploited the dis- ruption by redoubling efforts to levy false claims of election fraud and convince Members of Congress to further delay the certifcation.” Id., at 187–188, ¶10(e). Based on this alleged conduct, the indictment charged Trump with (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States in Page Proof Pending Publication violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371 , (2) conspiracy to obstruct an offcial proceeding in violation of § 1512(k), (3) obstruction of and attempt to obstruct an offcial proceeding in violation of § 1512(c)(2), § 2, and (4) conspiracy against rights in violation of § 241.1 Trump moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presi- dential immunity. In his view, the conduct alleged in the indictment, properly characterized, was that while he was President he (1) “made public statements about the adminis- tration of the federal election”; (2) communicated with senior Justice Department offcials “about investigating election 1 Trump contends that the indictment stretches Section 1512(c)(2) “far beyond its natural meaning.” Brief for Petitioner 39, n. 4. As we ex- plained in Fischer v. United States, Section 1512(c)(2) covers acts that impair “the availability or integrity for use in an offcial proceeding of records, documents, objects, or . . . other things used in the proceeding.” 603 U. S. 480 , 498 (2024). If necessary, the District Court should deter- mine in the frst instance whether the Section 1512(c)(2) charges may pro- ceed in light of our decision in Fischer. 604 TRUMP v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court fraud and about choosing the leadership” of the Department; (3) “communicated with state offcials about the administra- tion of the federal election and their exercise of offcial duties with respect to it”; (4) “communicated with the Vice Presi- dent” and with “Members of Congress about the exercise of their offcial duties regarding the election certifcation”; and (5) “authorized or directed others to organize contingent slates of electors in furtherance of his attempts to convince the Vice President to exercise his offcial authority in a man- ner advocated for by President Trump.” Motion To Dismiss Indictment Based on Presidential Immunity in No. 1:23–cr– 00257 (DC), ECF Doc. 74, p. 9. Trump argued that all of the indictment's allegations fell within the core of his offcial duties. Id., at 27. And he contended that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions per- formed within the outer perimeter of his offcial responsibil- ities, to ensure that he can undertake the especially sensitive Page Proof Pending Publication duties of his offce with bold and unhesitating action. Id., at 14, 24. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that “former Presidents do not possess absolute federal crim- inal immunity for any acts committed while in offce.” 704 F. Supp. 3d 196 , 220 (DC 2023). The District Court recog- nized that the President is immune from damages liability in civil cases, to protect against the chilling effect such expo- sure might have on the carrying out of his responsibilities. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 , 749–756 (1982). But it reasoned that “the possibility of vexatious post-Presidency litigation is much reduced in the criminal context” in light of “[t]he robust procedural safeguards attendant to federal criminal prosecutions.” 704 F. Supp. 3d, at 213–214. The District Court declined to decide whether the indicted con- duct involved offcial acts. See id., at 220. The D. C. Circuit affrmed. 91 F. 4th 1173 (2024) (per cu- riam). Citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), the court distinguished between two kinds of offcial acts: Cite as: 603 U. S. 593 (2024) 605 Opinion of the Court discretionary and ministerial. 91 F. 4th, at 1189–1190. It observed that “although discretionary acts are `only politi- cally examinable,' the judiciary has the power to hear cases” involving ministerial acts that an offcer is directed to per- form by the legislature. Ibid. (quoting Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 166 ). From this distinction, the D. C. Circuit concluded that the “separation of powers doctrine, as expounded in Marbury and its progeny, necessarily permits the Judiciary to oversee the federal criminal prosecution of a former Presi- dent for his offcial acts because the fact of the prosecution means that the former President has allegedly acted in def- ance of the Congress's laws.” 91 F. 4th, at 1191. In the court's view, the fact that Trump's actions “allegedly violated generally applicable criminal laws” meant that those actions “were not properly within the scope of his lawful discretion.” Id., at 1192. The D. C. Circuit thus concluded that Trump had “no structural immunity from the charges in the Indict- ment.” Ibid. Like the District Court, the D. C. Circuit de- Page Proof Pending Publication clined to analyze the actions described in the indictment to determine whether they involved offcial acts. See id., at 1205, n. 14. We granted certiorari to consider the following question: “Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve offcial acts during his tenure in offce.” 601 U. S. ––– (2024). II This case is the frst criminal prosecution in our Nation's history of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency. We are called upon to consider whether and under what circumstances such a prosecution may proceed. Doing so requires careful assessment of the scope of Presi- dential power under the Constitution. We undertake that responsibility conscious that we must not confuse “the issue of a power's validity with the cause it is invoked to promote,” 606 TRUMP v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court but must instead focus on the “enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure of our Republic.” Youngs- town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The parties before us do not dispute that a former Presi- dent can be subject to criminal prosecution for unoffcial acts committed while in offce. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. They also agree that some of the conduct described in the indict- ment includes actions taken by Trump in his unoffcial capac- ity. See id., at 28–30, 36–37, 124. They disagree, however, about whether a former President can be prosecuted for his offcial actions. Trump contends that just as a President is absolutely immune from civil dam- ages liability for acts within the outer perimeter of his off- cial responsibilities, Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 756 , he must be absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for such acts. Brief for Petitioner 10. And Trump argues that the bulk Page Proof Pending Publication of the indictment's allegations involve conduct in his offcial capacity as President. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30–32. Al- though the Government agrees that some offcial actions are included in the indictment's allegations, see id., at 125, it maintains that a former President does not enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution for any actions, regardless of how they are characterized. See Brief for United States 9. We conclude that under our constitutional structure of sep- arated powers, the nature of Presidential power requires that a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for offcial acts during his tenure in offce. At least with respect to the President's exercise of his core con- stitutional powers, this immunity must be absolute. As for his remaining offcial actions, he is also entitled to immunity. At the current stage of proceedings in this case, however, we need not and do not decide whether that immunity must be absolute, or instead whether a presumptive immunity is suffcient. Cite as: 603 U. S. 593 (2024) 607 Opinion of the Court A Article II of the Constitution provides that “[t]he execu- tive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” § 1, cl. 1. The President's duties are of “unrivaled gravity and breadth.” Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800 (2020). They include, for instance, command- ing the Armed Forces of the United States; granting re- prieves and pardons for offenses against the United States; and appointing public ministers and consuls, the Justices of this Court, and Offcers of the United States. See § 2. He also has important foreign relations responsibilities: making treaties, appointing ambassadors, recognizing foreign gov- ernments, meeting foreign leaders, overseeing international diplomacy and intelligence gathering, and managing matters related to terrorism, trade, and immigration. See §§ 2, 3. Domestically, he must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” § 3, and he bears responsibility for the actions of Page Proof Pending Publication the many departments and agencies within the Executive Branch. He also plays a role in lawmaking by recommend- ing to Congress the measures he thinks wise and signing or vetoing the bills Congress passes. See Art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Art. II, § 3. No matter the context, the President's authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 585 . In the latter case, the President's authority is someti