Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023)

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 600 U. S. Part 1 Pages 181–411 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 29, 2023 Page Proof Pending Publication REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors. OCTOBER TERM, 2022 181 Syllabus STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the rst circuit No. 20–1199. Argued October 31, 2022—Decided June 29, 2023* Harvard College and the University of North Carolina (UNC) are two of the oldest institutions of higher learning in the United States. Every year, tens of thousands of students apply to each school; many fewer are admitted. Both Harvard and UNC employ a highly selective admis- sions process to make their decisions. Admission to each school can depend on a student's grades, recommendation letters, or extracurricu- lar involvement. It can also depend on their race. The question pre- sented is whether the admissions systems used by Harvard College and UNC are lawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At Harvard, each application for admission is initially screened by a Page Proof Pending Publication “frst reader,” who assigns a numerical score in each of six categories: academic, extracurricular, athletic, school support, personal, and overall. For the “overall” category—a composite of the fve other ratings—a frst reader can and does consider the applicant's race. Harvard's admissions subcommittees then review all applications from a particular geographic area. These regional subcommittees make recommendations to the full admissions committee, and they take an applicant's race into account. When the 40-member full admissions committee begins its deliberations, it discusses the relative breakdown of applicants by race. The goal of the process, according to Harvard's director of admissions, is ensuring there is no “dramatic drop-off” in minority admissions from the prior class. An applicant receiving a majority of the full committee's votes is tentatively accepted for admission. At the end of this process, the racial composition of the tentative applicant pool is disclosed to the com- mittee. The last stage of Harvard's admissions process, called the “lop,” winnows the list of tentatively admitted students to arrive at the fnal class. Applicants that Harvard considers cutting at this stage are placed on the “lop list,” which contains only four pieces of information: *Together with No. 21–707, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Uni- versity of North Carolina et al., on certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 182 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE Syllabus legacy status, recruited athlete status, fnancial aid eligibility, and race. In the Harvard admissions process, “race is a determinative tip for” a signifcant percentage “of all admitted African American and Hispanic applicants.” UNC has a similar admissions process. Every application is re- viewed frst by an admissions offce reader, who assigns a numerical rating to each of several categories. Readers are required to consider the applicant's race as a factor in their review. Readers then make a written recommendation on each assigned application, and they may provide an applicant a substantial “plus” depending on the applicant's race. At this stage, most recommendations are provisionally fnal. A committee of experienced staff members then conducts a “school group review” of every initial decision made by a reader and either approves or rejects the recommendation. In making those decisions, the commit- tee may consider the applicant's race. Petitioner, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), is a nonproft orga- nization whose stated purpose is “to defend human and civil rights se- cured by law, including the right of individuals to equal protection under the law.” SFFA fled separate lawsuits against Harvard and UNC, ar- guing that their race-based admissions programs violate, respectively, Page Proof Pending Publication Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After separate bench trials, both ad- missions programs were found permissible under the Equal Protection Clause and this Court's precedents. In the Harvard case, the First Cir- cuit affrmed, and this Court granted certiorari. In the UNC case, this Court granted certiorari before judgment. Held: Harvard's and UNC's admissions programs violate the Equal Protec- tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 198–231. (a) Because SFFA complies with the standing requirements for orga- nizational plaintiffs articulated by this Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U. S. 333 , SFFA's obligations under Article III are satisfed, and this Court has jurisdiction to con- sider the merits of SFFA's claims. The Court rejects UNC's argument that SFFA lacks standing because it is not a “genuine” membership organization. An organizational plain- tiff can satisfy Article III jurisdiction in two ways, one of which is to assert “standing solely as the representative of its members,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 511 , an approach known as representational or organizational standing. To invoke it, an organization must satisfy the three-part test in Hunt. Respondents do not suggest that SFFA fails Hunt's test for organizational standing. They argue instead that SFFA cannot invoke organizational standing at all because SFFA was not a Cite as: 600 U. S. 181 (2023) 183 Syllabus genuine membership organization at the time it fled suit. Respondents maintain that, under Hunt, a group qualifes as a genuine membership organization only if it is controlled and funded by its members. In Hunt, this Court determined that a state agency with no traditional members could still qualify as a genuine membership organization in substance because the agency represented the interests of individuals and otherwise satisfed Hunt's three-part test for organizational stand- ing. See 432 U. S., at 342 . Hunt's “indicia of membership” analysis, however, has no applicability here. As the courts below found, SFFA is indisputably a voluntary membership organization with identifable members who support its mission and whom SFFA represents in good faith. SFFA is thus entitled to rely on the organizational standing doc- trine as articulated in Hunt. Pp. 198–201. (b) Proposed by Congress and ratifed by the States in the wake of the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” Proponents of the Equal Protection Clause described its “foundation[al] principle” as “not permit[ing] any distinctions of law based on race or color.” Any “law which operates upon one man,” they maintained, should “operate equally upon all.” Accordingly, as this Court's early decisions inter- preting the Equal Protection Clause explained, the Fourteenth Amend- Page Proof Pending Publication ment guaranteed “that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States.” Despite the early recognition of the broad sweep of the Equal Protec- tion Clause, the Court—alongside the country—quickly failed to live up to the Clause's core commitments. For almost a century after the Civil War, state-mandated segregation was in many parts of the Nation a regrettable norm. This Court played its own role in that ignoble his- tory, allowing in Plessy v. Ferguson the separate but equal regime that would come to deface much of America. 163 U. S. 537 . After Plessy, “American courts . . . labored with the doctrine [of sepa- rate but equal] for over half a century.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 491 . Some cases in this period attempted to curtail the perniciousness of the doctrine by emphasizing that it required States to provide black students educational opportunities equal to—even if formally separate from—those enjoyed by white students. See, e. g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 , 349–350. But the inherent folly of that approach—of trying to derive equality from in- equality—soon became apparent. As the Court subsequently recog- nized, even racial distinctions that were argued to have no palpable effect worked to subordinate the afficted students. See, e. g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U. S. 637 , 184 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE Syllabus 640–642. By 1950, the inevitable truth of the Fourteenth Amendment had thus begun to reemerge: Separate cannot be equal. The culmination of this approach came fnally in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 . There, the Court overturned the separate but equal regime established in Plessy and began on the path of invali- dating all de jure racial discrimination by the States and Federal Gov- ernment. The conclusion reached by the Brown Court was unmistak- ably clear: the right to a public education “must be made available to all on equal terms.” 347 U. S., at 493 . The Court reiterated that rule just one year later, holding that “full compliance” with Brown required schools to admit students “on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.” Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 , 300–301. In the years that followed, Brown's “fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional,” id., at 298 , reached other areas of life—for example, state and local laws requiring segregation in busing, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903 (per curiam); racial segregation in the enjoyment of public beaches and bathhouses, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U. S. 877 (per cu- riam); and antimiscegenation laws, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 . These decisions, and others like them, refect the “core purpose” of the Equal Protection Clause: “do[ing] away with all governmentally Page Proof Pending Publication imposed discrimination based on race.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 432 . Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it. Accord- ingly, the Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause applies “with- out regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality”—it is “universal in [its] application.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 . For “[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 , 289– 290 (opinion of Powell, J.). Any exceptions to the Equal Protection Clause's guarantee must sur- vive a daunting two-step examination known as “strict scrutiny,” Ada- rand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 , which asks frst whether the racial classifcation is used to “further compelling govern- mental interests,” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 326 , and second whether the government's use of race is “narrowly tailored,” i. e., “nec- essary,” to achieve that interest, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 570 U. S. 297 , 311–312. Acceptance of race-based state action is rare for a reason: “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their an- cestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institu- tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U. S. 495, 517 . Pp. 201–208. Cite as: 600 U. S. 181 (2023) 185 Syllabus (c) This Court frst considered whether a university may make race- based admissions decisions in Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 . In a deeply splin- tered decision that produced six different opinions, Justice Powell's opin- ion for himself alone would eventually come to “serv[e] as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.” Grut- ter, 539 U. S., at 323 . After rejecting three of the University's four justifcations as not suffciently compelling, Justice Powell turned to its last interest asserted to be compelling—obtaining the educational bene- fts that fow from a racially diverse student body. Justice Powell found that interest to be “a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education,” which was entitled as a matter of academic free- dom “to make its own judgments as to . . . the selection of its student body.” 438 U. S., at 311–312. But a university's freedom was not un- limited—“[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently sus- pect,” Justice Powell explained, and antipathy toward them was deeply “rooted in our Nation's constitutional and demographic history.” Id., at 291. Accordingly, a university could not employ a two-track quota sys- tem with a specifc number of seats reserved for individuals from a pre- ferred ethnic group. Id., at 315. Neither still could a university use race to foreclose an individual from all consideration. Id., at 318. Race Page Proof Pending Publication could only operate as “a `plus' in a particular applicant's fle,” and even then it had to be weighed in a manner “fexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifcations of each applicant.” Id., at 317. Pp. 208–210. (d) For years following Bakke, lower courts struggled to determine whether Justice Powell's decision was “binding precedent.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 325 . Then, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court for the frst time “endorse[d] Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.” Ibid. The Grutter majority's analysis tracked Justice Powell's in many respects, including its insistence on limits on how uni- versities may consider race in their admissions programs. Those limits, Grutter explained, were intended to guard against two dangers that all race-based government action portends. The frst is the risk that the use of race will devolve into “illegitimate . . . stereotyp[ing].” Rich- mond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (plurality opinion). Admis- sions programs could thus not operate on the “belief that minority stu- dents always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted). The second risk is that race would be used not as a plus, but as a negative—to discriminate against those racial groups that were not the benefciaries of the race-based preference. A university's 186 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE Syllabus use of race, accordingly, could not occur in a manner that “unduly harm[ed] nonminority applicants.” Id., at 341 . To manage these concerns, Grutter imposed one fnal limit on race- based admissions programs: At some point, the Court held, they must end. Id., at 342 . Recognizing that “[e]nshrining a permanent justif- cation for racial preferences would offend” the Constitution's unambigu- ous guarantee of equal protection, the Court expressed its expectation that, in 25 years, “the use of racial preferences will no longer be neces- sary to further the interest approved today.” Id., at 343 . Pp. 211–213. (e) Twenty years have passed since Grutter, with no end to race-based college admissions in sight. But the Court has permitted race-based college admissions only within the confnes of narrow restrictions: such admissions programs must comply with strict scrutiny, may never use race as a stereotype or negative, and must—at some point—end. Re- spondents' admissions systems fail each of these criteria and must there- fore be invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 213–225. (1) Respondents fail to operate their race-based admissions pro- grams in a manner that is “suffciently measurable to permit judicial [review]” under the rubric of strict scrutiny. Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 579 U. S. 365, 381 . First, the interests that respondents Page Proof Pending Publication view as compelling cannot be subjected to meaningful judicial review. Those interests include training future leaders, acquiring new knowl- edge based on diverse outlooks, promoting a robust marketplace of ideas, and preparing engaged and productive citizens. While these are commendable goals, they are not suffciently coherent for purposes of strict scrutiny. It is unclear how courts are supposed to measure any of these goals, or if they could, to know when they have been reached so that racial preferences can end. The elusiveness of respondents' as- serted goals is further illustrated by comparing them to recognized com- pelling interests. For example, courts can discern whether the tempo- rary racial segregation of inmates will prevent harm to those in the prison, see Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499 , 512–513, but the ques- tion whether a particular mix of minority students produces “engaged and productive citizens” or effectively “ train[s] future leaders” is standardless. Second, respondents' admissions programs fail to articulate a mean- ingful connection between the means they employ and the goals they pursue. To achieve the educational benefts of diversity, respondents measure the racial composition of their classes using racial categories that are plainly overbroad (expressing, for example, no concern whether South Asian or East Asian students are adequately represented as “Asian”); arbitrary or undefned (the use of the category “Hispanic”); or Cite as: 600 U. S. 181 (2023) 187 Syllabus underinclusive (no category at all for Middle Eastern students). The unclear connection between the goals that respondents seek and the means they employ preclude courts from meaningfully scrutinizing re- spondents' admissions programs. The universities' main response to these criticisms is “trust us.” They assert that universities are owed deference when using race to beneft some applicants but not others. While this Court has recog- nized a “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's aca- demic decisions,” it has made clear that deference must exist “within constitutionally prescribed limits.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 328 . Re- spondents have failed to present an exceedingly persuasive justifcation for separating students on the basis of race that is measurable and con- crete enough to permit judicial review, as the Equal Protection Clause requires. Pp. 214–218. (2) Respondents' race-based admissions systems also fail to comply with the Equal Protection Clause's twin commands that race may never be used as a “negative” and that it may not operate as a stereotype. The First Circuit found that Harvard's consideration of race has resulted in fewer admissions of Asian-American students. Respondents' asser- tion that race is never a negative factor in their admissions programs cannot withstand scrutiny. College admissions are zero-sum, and a Page Proof Pending Publication beneft provided to some applicants but not to others necessarily advan- tages the former at the expense of the latter. Respondents' admissions programs are infrm for a second reason as well: They require stereotyping—the very thing Grutter foreswore. When a university admits students “on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that [students] of a particular race, because of their race, think alike.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 , 911–912. Such stereotyping is contrary to the “core purpose” of the Equal Protection Clause. Palmore, 466 U. S., at 432 . Pp. 218–221. (3) Respondents' admissions programs also lack a “logical end point” as Grutter required. 539 U. S., at 342 . Respondents suggest that the end of race-based admissions programs will occur once mean- ingful representation and diversity are achieved on college campuses. Such measures of success amount to little more than comparing the ra- cial breakdown of the incoming class and comparing it to some other metric, such as the racial makeup of the previous incoming class or the population in general, to see whether some proportional goal has been reached. The problem with this approach is well established: “[O]ut- right racial balancing” is “patently unconstitutional.” Fisher, 570 U. S., at 311 . Respondents' second proffered end point—when students re- ceive the educational benefts of diversity—fares no better. As ex- plained, it is unclear how a court is supposed to determine if or when 188 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE Syllabus such goals would be adequately met. Third, respondents suggest the 25-year expectation in Grutter means that race-based preferences must be allowed to continue until at least 2028. The Court's statement in Grutter, however, refected only that Court's expectation that race- based preferences would, by 2028, be unnecessary in the context of ra- cial diversity on college campuses. Finally, respondents argue that the frequent reviews they conduct to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary obviates the need for an end point. But Grutter never suggested that periodic review can make unconstitutional conduct constitutional. Pp. 221–225. (f) Because Harvard's and UNC's admissions programs lack suff- ciently focused and measurable objectives warranting the use of race, unavoidably employ race in a negative manner, involve racial stereotyp- ing, and lack meaningful end points, those admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. At the same time, nothing prohibits universities from considering an appli- cant's discussion of how race affected the applicant's life, so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the university. Many universities have for too long wrongly concluded that the touchstone of an individual's identity is not challenges bested, skills built, or lessons Page Proof Pending Publication learned, but the color of their skin. This Nation's constitutional history does not tolerate that choice. Pp. 230–231. No. 20–1199, 980 F. 3d 157 ; No. 21–707, 567 F. Supp. 3d 580 , reversed. Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 231. Gorsuch, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 287. Kavanaugh, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 311. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan, J., joined, and in which Jackson, J., joined as it applies to No. 21–707, post, p. 318. Jackson, J., fled a dissenting opinion in No. 21–707, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 384. Jackson, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 20–1199. Cameron T. Norris argued the cause for petitioner in No. 20–1199. With him on the briefs were William S. Conso- voy, Thomas R. McCarthy, J. Michael Connolly, Bryan Weir, James F. Hasson, Adam K. Mortara, Patrick Straw- bridge, and Alan M. Ruley. Mr. Strawbridge argued the Cite as: 600 U. S. 181 (2023) 189 Counsel cause for petitioner in No. 21–707. With him on the briefs were Messrs. Consovoy, McCarthy, Connolly, Norris, Weir, Hasson, Mortara, and Ruley. Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondent in No. 20–1199. With him on the briefs were Catherine M. A. Car- roll, Claire H. Chung, Debo P. Adegbile, Rishita Apsani, William F. Lee, Felicia H. Ellsworth, Hannah E. Gelbort, Diane E. Lopez, and Ara B. Gershengorn. Ryan Y. Park, Solicitor General of North Carolina, argued the cause for uni- versity respondents in No. 21–707. With him on the brief were Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General of North Carolina, Nicholas S. Brod, Sarah G. Boyce, and James W. Doggett, Deputy Solicitors General, Sripriya Narasimhan, Deputy General Counsel, Stephanie A. Brennan and Tamika L. Hen- derson, Special Deputy Attorneys General, Patrick Fitzger- ald, Amy Van Gelder, and Lara Flath. David G. Hinojosa argued the cause for student respondents Cecilia Polanco et al. in No. 21–707. With him on the brief were Damon T. Page Proof Pending Publication Hewitt, Jon Greenbaum, Reed N. Colfax, Soohyun Choi, and Gemma Donofrio. Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affrmance in both cases. With her on the brief were Acting Principal Deputy Assist- ant Attorney General Smith, Deputy Solicitor General Flet- cher, Masha G. Hansford, Nicolas Y. Riley, Elizabeth Parr Hecker, Jonathan E. Meyer, and Samuel R. Bagenstos.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for the State of Oklahoma et al. by John O'Connor, Attorney General of Okla- homa, and Mithun Mansinghani, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Mark Brnovich of Arizona, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Chris Carr of Georgia, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Eric Schmitt of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Doug Peterson of Nebraska, Drew H. Wrigley of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Jason S. Miyares of 190 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. In these cases we consider whether the admissions sys- tems used by Harvard College and the University of North Virginia, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for the State of Texas by Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Judd E. Stone II, Solicitor General, Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Rance Craft, Assistant Solicitor General, and Brent Webster, First Assistant At- torney General; for the American Center for Law and Justice et al. by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Jordan A. Sekulow, Colby M. May, and Walter M. Weber; for the Californians for Equal Rights Foundation by Daniel I. Morenoff; for the Defense of Freedom Institute for Policy Stud- ies by John C. Sullivan; for Economists by C. Boyden Gray, R. Trent McCotter, and Jonathan Berry; for the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute et al. by Theodore H. Frank, Anna St. John, and Ilya Shapiro, pro se; for the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law et al. by Jonathan A. Vogel; for the National Association of Scholars by Dennis J. Saffran; for the Pacifc Legal Foundation et al. by Joshua P. Thompson, Anastasia P. Boden, Wencong Fa, and Alison Somin; for Project 21 by Page Proof Pending Publication David H. Thompson, Peter A. Patterson, John D. Ohlendorf, and Megan M. Wold; for United States Senators et al. by R. Shawn Gunnarson; and for Mark Keith Robinson et al. by Thomas Brejcha and B. Tyler Brooks. A brief of amicus curiae urging vacatur in both cases was fled for F. Andrew Hessick by Richard A. Simpson and Mr. Hessick, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 20–1199 were fled for the America First Legal Foundation by Jonathan F. Mitchell and Gene P. Hamilton; and for the for the Foundation Against Intolerance & Racism by Mary E. Keane. A brief of amici curiae urging vacatur was fled for Fiona A. Harrison by Alan B. Morrison in No. 20–1199. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Maura Healey, Attorney Gen- eral of Massachusetts, Elizabeth N. Dewar, State Solicitor, and Ann E. Lynch and David Ureña, Assistant Attorneys General, by Karl A. Racine, Attorney General of the District of Columbia, by Matthew J. Platkin, Act- ing Attorney General of New Jersey, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Rob Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Holly T. Shikada of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Keith Ellison of Minne- sota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Hector Balderas of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Penn- Cite as: 600 U. S. 181 (2023) 191 Opinion of the Court Carolina, two of the oldest institutions of higher learning in the United States, are lawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. sylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Robert W. Ferguson of Wash- ington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; for Admissions and Testing Pro- fessionals by Daniel D. Doyle; for the American Bar Association by Reginald M. Turner, Jr., Loretta Lynch, Sidney Rosdeitcher, Jaren Jan- ghorbani, Jennifer H. Wu, Josephine Young, and Johan E. Tatoy; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Sarah Hinger, Jennesa Calvo- Friedman, ReNika Moore, David D. Cole, Matthew R. Segal, and Kristi L. Graunke; for the American Council on Education et al. by Jessica L. Ellsworth, Madelyn F. Wessel, and Johannah Walker; for the American Educational Research Association et al. by Angelo N. Ancheta; for the American Federation of Teachers by Kevin K. Russell, Rhonda Weingar- ten, and David J. Strom; for the American G. I. Forum et al. by Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Joshua P. Dunn, Lourdes M. Rosado, and Francisca Fajana; for the American Psychological Association et al. by Melissa Arbus Sherry, Deanne M. Ottaviano, and Nathalie Gilfoyle; for Amherst College et al. by Mark D. Harris and John E. Roberts; for Applied Materials, Inc., et al. Page Proof Pending Publication by Mark S. Davies, Thomas M. Bondy, Katherine M. Kopp, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, and Darren S. Teshima; for the Asian American Legal De- fense and Education Fund et al. by Dean Richlin, Madeleine K. Rodri- guez, and Bethany Li; for Asian Americans Advancing Justice et al. by Roberto A. Rivera-Soto, Michael R. McDonald, Niyati Shah, Eri Andri- ola, Winifred Kao, and Laboni Hoq; for the Association of American Medi- cal Colleges et al. by Jonathan S. Franklin, Peter B. Siegal, Heather J. Alarcon, and Frank R. Trinity; for Black Women Law Scholars by Ray- mond P. Tolentino and Joshua Matz; for Brown University et al. by Mat- thew S. Hellman, Ishan K. Bhabha, and Lauren J. Hartz; for the Constitu- tional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and David H. Gans; for the Council of the Great City Schools by John W. Borkowski, Aleksandra O. Rushing, and Julie Wright Halbert; for Deans of U. S. Law Schools by David B. Oppenheimer; for Faith Organizations by Corrine Irish and Keith Bradley; for Georgetown University et al. by Crystal Nix-Hines, Kathleen M. Sullivan, and Justin T. Reinheimer; for HBCU Leaders et al. by Laurel Pyke Malson and Amanda Shafer Ber- man; for the HR Policy Association by G. Roger King and Jacquelyn L. Thompson; for the Law Firm Antiracism Alliance by Stephen R. McAllis- ter and Simon A. Steel; for Legal Scholars Defending Race-Conscious Ad- missions by Vinay Harpalani; for Major American Business Enterprises by Michael R. Dreeben, Heather Welles, Melissa C. Cassel, and Ruthanne 192 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE Opinion of the Court I A Founded in 1636, Harvard College has one of the most se- lective application processes in the country. Over 60,000 M. Deutsch; for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology et al. by Doug- las Hallward-Driemeier, Debra L. Zumwalt, and Dahlia Fetouh; for the Multicultural Media, Telecom and Internet Council, Inc., et al. by Emily Kanstroom Musgrave, Susan Finegan, and Tara M. Corvo; for the Na- tional Academy of Education by Yelena Konanova, Caitlin J. Halligan, and Amy I. Berman; for the National Asian Pacifc American Bar Associa- tion et al. by Daniel H. Bromberg, Albert Giang, Rachana Pathak, and Navdeep Singh; for the National Association of Basketball Coaches et al. by Jaime A. Santos; for the National Black Law Students Association by Deborah N. Archer and Vincent M. Southerland; for the National Educa- tion Association et al. by Alice O'Brien, Jason Walta, and Nicole G. Berner; for the National School Boards Association et al. by Pratik A. Shah, Aileen M. McGrath, Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., and Sonja H. Trainor; for the National Women's Law Center et al. by Richard C. Smith, Page Proof Pending Publication Meredith Riley, Patrick Ashby, Menaka Nayar, Fatima Goss Graves, Emily Martin, and Sunu P. Chandy; for the President of the University of California et al. by Ginger D. Anders, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Charles F. Robinson, and Allison M. Day; for Professors of History and Law by Kathleen Hartnett, Adam S. Gershenson, and Kristen A. Johnson; for Southern Governors by Charles L. McCloud and Matthew J. Greer; for United States Senators et al. by Robert A. Long, Jr., and Eric Chung; for the University of Michigan by John P. Elwood, Stephen K. Wirth, and Timothy G. Lynch; for the Washington Bar Association et al. by Upnit K. Bhatti, Max Carter-Oberstone, and Daniel A. Rubens; for Youth Advo- cates et al. by Kelly M. Dermody and Miriam Rollin; for Charles S. Abbot et al. by Michael M. Purpura, Joe R. Reeder, Robert P. Charrow, and Elliot H. Scherker; for Deborah Cohen et al. by Mark A. Packman; for Robert C. “Bobby” Scott et al. by Brigida Benitez and Christopher A. Suarez; and for 25 Diverse, California-Focused Bar Associations et al. by Mark R. Yohalem and Eva Paterson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in No. 20–1199 were fled for the Anti-Defamation League by Samuel P. Groner and Steven M. Free- man; for Professors of Economics by Derek T. Ho, Bradley E. Oppenhei- mer, and Minsuk Han; for Students of Harvard College et al. by Elisabeth S. Theodore, John A. Freedman, Nancy L. Perkins, Sally L. Pei, Damon Hewitt, Jon Greenbaum, David G. Hinojosa, and Mses. Shah and Andri- Cite as: 600 U. S. 181 (2023) 193 Opinion of the Court people applied to the school last year; fewer than 2,000 were admitted. Gaining admission to Harvard is thus no easy feat. It can depend on having excellent grades, glowing rec- ommendation letters, or overcoming signifcant adversity. ola; for 25 Harvard Student Organizations et al. by Jin Hee Lee, Mi- chaele N. Turnage Young, Jennifer A. Holmes, Janai S. Nelson, Samuel Spital, Rachel M. Kleinman, and Cara McClellan; and for 1,241 Social Scientists et al. by Daniel Woofter, Erica Oleszczuk Evans, and Liliana M. Garces. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in No. 21–707 were fled for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Ms. Nelson, Mr. Spital, Alexsis M. Johnson, Mr. Lee, and Amber M. Koonce; and for 1,246 American Social Science Researchers et al. by Caroline E. Reynolds, David A. Reiser, and William J. Murphy. Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases for the American Associa- tion for Access, Equity and Diversity et al. by Marilynn L. Schuyler; for the Asian American Coalition for Education et al. by Gordon M. Fauth, Jr.; for the Claremont Institute's Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John C. Eastman and Anthony T. Caso; for the College Board et al. by Page Proof Pending Publication Michael A. Brown, Timothy P. Harkness, David Y. Livshiz, and Scott A. Eisman; for Empirical Scholars by Susan Baker Manning; for Former Federal Offcials of the U. S. Dept. of Education's Offce for Civil Rights by William E. Trachman; for Freedom X by Mitchell Keiter and William J. Becker, Jr.; for Human Rights Advocates et al. by Constance de la Vega and Neil A. F. Popović; for Individual Scientists by Ashley Lee Hogewood III, David R. Fine, and Andrew C. Glass; for Judicial Watch, Inc., et al. by H. Christopher Coates; for the Legal Insurrection Foundation by Wil- liam A. Jacobson; for the Liberty Justice Center et al. by Daniel R. Suhr; for the LONANG Institute by Kerry Lee Morgan and Randall A. Pen- tiuk; for Parents Defending Education by Christopher E. Mills; for Speech First by Bradley A. Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay; for Veterans for Fairness by Gene C. Schaerr, Erik S. Jaffe, H. Christopher Bartolomucci, Hannah C. Smith, Kathryn E. Tarbert, and Claude M. McQuarrie III; for David E. Bernstein by Cory R. Liu; for David Boyle by Mr. Boyle, pro se; for Gail Heriot et al. by Peter N. Kirsanow and Ms. Heriot, both pro se; for Ann M. Killenbeck et al. by Stuart Taylor, Jr.; for Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III by Edward M. Wenger; and for Richard Sander by Mr. Taylor. Briefs of amici curiae were fled in No. 20–1199 for the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty by Kristen K. Waggoner, John J. Bursch, David A. Cortman, and Erin Morrow Hawley; and for the South- eastern Legal Foundation by Kimberly S. Hermann. 194 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE Opinion of the Court See 980 F. 3d 157 , 166–169 (CA1 2020). It can also depend on your race. The admissions process at Harvard works as follows. Every application is initially screened by a “frst reader,” who assigns scores in six categories: academic, extracurricu- lar, athletic, school support, personal, and overall. Ibid. A rating of “1” is the best; a rating of “6” the worst. Ibid. In the academic category, for example, a “1” signifes “near- perfect standardized test scores and grades”; in the extra- curricular category, it indicates “truly unusual achievement”; and in the personal category, it denotes “outstanding” attrib- utes like maturity, integrity, leadership, kindness, and cour- age.