Shelby County v. Holder (2013)

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 . SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 12–96. Argued February 27, 2013—Decided June 25, 2013 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting, “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.” South Carolina v. Kat- zenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309 . Section 2 of the Act, which bans any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color,” 42 U. S. C. §1973 (a), applies nationwide, is permanent, and is not at issue in this case. Other sections apply only to some parts of the country. Section 4 of the Act provides the “coverage formula,” de- fining the “covered jurisdictions” as States or political subdivisions that maintained tests or devices as prerequisites to voting, and had low voter registration or turnout, in the 1960s and early 1970s. §1973b(b). In those covered jurisdictions, §5 of the Act provides that no change in voting procedures can take effect until approved by specified federal authorities in Washington, D. C. §1973c(a). Such approval is known as “preclearance.” The coverage formula and preclearance requirement were initially set to expire after five years, but the Act has been reauthorized sev- eral times. In 2006, the Act was reauthorized for an additional 25 years, but the coverage formula was not changed. Coverage still turned on whether a jurisdiction had a voting test in the 1960s or 1970s, and had low voter registration or turnout at that time. Short- ly after the 2006 reauthorization, a Texas utility district sought to bail out from the Act’s coverage and, in the alternative, challenged the Act’s constitutionality. This Court resolved the challenge on statutory grounds, but expressed serious doubts about the Act’s con- 2 SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER Syllabus tinued constitutionality. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193 . Petitioner Shelby County, in the covered jurisdiction of Alabama, sued the Attorney General in Federal District Court in Washington, D. C., seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 are fa- cially unconstitutional, as well as a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The District Court upheld the Act, finding that the evidence before Congress in 2006 was sufficient to justify reau- thorizing §5 and continuing §4(b)’s coverage formula. The D. C. Cir- cuit affirmed. After surveying the evidence in the record, that court accepted Congress’s conclusion that §2 litigation remained inade- quate in the covered jurisdictions to protect the rights of minority voters, that §5 was therefore still necessary, and that the coverage formula continued to pass constitutional muster. Held: Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; its formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to pre- clearance. Pp. 9–25. (a) In Northwest Austin, this Court noted that the Voting Rights Act “imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs” and concluded that “a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geo- graphic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” 557 U. S., at 203 . These basic principles guide review of the question presented here. Pp. 9–17. (1) State legislation may not contravene federal law. States re- tain broad autonomy, however, in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment re- serves to the States all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government, including “the power to regulate elections.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452 , 461–462. There is also a “fundamental prin- ciple of equal sovereignty” among the States, which is highly perti- nent in assessing disparate treatment of States. Northwest Austin, supra, at 203 . The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It requires States to beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own. And despite the tradition of equal sover- eignty, the Act applies to only nine States (and additional counties). That is why, in 1966, this Court described the Act as “stringent” and “potent,” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308, 315, 337 . The Court nonethe- less upheld the Act, concluding that such an “uncommon exercise of congressional power” could be justified by “exceptional conditions.” Id., at 334 . Pp. 9–12. (2) In 1966, these departures were justified by the “blight of ra- Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 Syllabus cial discrimination in voting” that had “infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century,” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308 . At the time, the coverage formula—the means of linking the exercise of the unprecedented authority with the problem that war- ranted it—made sense. The Act was limited to areas where Congress found “evidence of actual voting discrimination,” and the covered ju- risdictions shared two characteristics: “the use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential elec- tion at least 12 points below the national average.” Id., at 330 . The Court explained that “[t]ests and devices are relevant to voting dis- crimination because of their long history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of actual voters.” Ibid. The Court therefore concluded that “the cover- age formula [was] rational in both practice and theory.” Ibid. Pp. 12–13. (3) Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically. Largely because of the Voting Rights Act, “[v]oter turnout and regis- tration rates” in covered jurisdictions “now approach parity. Blatant- ly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.” Northwest Austin, supra, at 202 . The tests and devices that blocked ballot access have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years. Yet the Act has not eased §5’s restrictions or narrowed the scope of §4’s coverage formula along the way. Instead those extraordinary and unprecedented fea- tures have been reauthorized as if nothing has changed, and they have grown even stronger. Because §5 applies only to those jurisdic- tions singled out by §4, the Court turns to consider that provision. Pp. 13–17. (b) Section 4’s formula is unconstitutional in light of current condi- tions. Pp. 17–25. (1) In 1966, the coverage formula was “rational in both practice and theory.” Katzenbach, supra, at 330 . It looked to cause (discrimi- natory tests) and effect (low voter registration and turnout), and tai- lored the remedy (preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both. By 2009, however, the “coverage formula raise[d] serious constitu- tional questions.” Northwest Austin, supra, at 204 . Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registra- tion and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned for over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in covered States have risen dramatically. In 1965, the States could be divided into those with a recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout and those without those char- 4 SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER Syllabus acteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Vot- ing Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were. Pp. 17–18. (2) The Government attempts to defend the formula on grounds that it is “reverse-engineered”—Congress identified the jurisdictions to be covered and then came up with criteria to describe them. Kat- zenbach did not sanction such an approach, reasoning instead that the coverage formula was rational because the “formula . . . was rele- vant to the problem.” 383 U. S., at 329, 330 . The Government has a fallback argument—because the formula was relevant in 1965, its continued use is permissible so long as any discrimination remains in the States identified in 1965. But this does not look to “current polit- ical conditions,” Northwest Austin, supra, at 203 , instead relying on a comparison between the States in 1965. But history did not end in 1965. In assessing the “current need[ ]” for a preclearance system treating States differently from one another today, history since 1965 cannot be ignored. The Fifteenth Amendment is not designed to pun- ish for the past; its purpose is to ensure a better future. To serve that purpose, Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. Pp. 18–21. (3) Respondents also rely heavily on data from the record com- piled by Congress before reauthorizing the Act. Regardless of how one looks at that record, no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the “pervasive,” “flagrant,” “widespread,” and “rampant” discrimination that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation in 1965. Katzenbach, supra, at 308, 315, 331 . But a more fundamental problem remains: Congress did not use that record to fashion a coverage formula grounded in current condi- tions. It instead re-enacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts hav- ing no logical relation to the present day. Pp. 21–22. 679 F. 3d 848 , reversed. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concur- ring opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 12–96 _________________ SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA, PETITIONER v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [June 25, 2013] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem. Section 5 of the Act required States to obtain federal permission before enacting any law related to voting—a drastic depar- ture from basic principles of federalism. And §4 of the Act applied that requirement only to some States—an equally dramatic departure from the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty. This was strong medicine, but Congress determined it was needed to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting, “an insidious and perva- sive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309 (1966). As we explained in upholding the law, “exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.” Id., at 334 . Reflect- ing the unprecedented nature of these measures, they were scheduled to expire after five years. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, §4(a), 79 Stat. 438 . 2 SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court Nearly 50 years later, they are still in effect; indeed, they have been made more stringent, and are now sched- uled to last until 2031. There is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions. By 2009, “the racial gap in voter registration and turnout [was] lower in the States originally covered by §5 than it [was] nationwide.” Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193 , 203–204 (2009). Since that time, Census Bureau data indicate that African- American voter turnout has come to exceed white voter turnout in five of the six States originally covered by §5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one half of one percent. See Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Re- ported Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race and His- panic Origin, for States (Nov. 2012) (Table 4b). At the same time, voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that. The question is whether the Act’s ex- traordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of the States, continue to satisfy constitutional requirements. As we put it a short time ago, “the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.” North- west Austin, 557 U. S., at 203 . I A The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, in the wake of the Civil War. It provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” and it gives Congress the “power to enforce this article by appro- priate legislation.” “The first century of congressional enforcement of the Amendment, however, can only be regarded as a failure.” Id., at 197 . In the 1890s, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia began to enact literacy tests for voter registration and to employ other methods designed to prevent African- Americans from voting. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 310 . Congress passed statutes outlawing some of these practices and facilitating litigation against them, but litigation remained slow and expensive, and the States came up with new ways to discriminate as soon as existing ones were struck down. Voter registration of African-Americans barely improved. Id., at 313–314. Inspired to action by the civil rights movement, Con- gress responded in 1965 with the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 was enacted to forbid, in all 50 States, any “standard, practice, or procedure . . . imposed or applied . . . to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 79 Stat. 437 . The current version forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U. S. C. §1973 (a). Both the Federal Government and individuals have sued to enforce §2, see, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997 (1994), and injunctive relief is available in appropriate cases to block voting laws from going into effect, see 42 U. S. C. §1973j(d). Section 2 is permanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case. Other sections targeted only some parts of the country. At the time of the Act’s passage, these “covered” jurisdic- tions were those States or political subdivisions that had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election. §4(b), 79 Stat. 438 . Such tests or devices included literacy and knowledge tests, good moral character requirements, the need for vouchers from registered voters, and the like. §4(c), id., at 438–439. A covered jurisdiction could “bail 4 SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court out” of coverage if it had not used a test or device in the preceding five years “for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” §4(a), id., at 438. In 1965, the covered States included Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia. The additional covered subdivi- sions included 39 counties in North Carolina and one in Arizona. See 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (2012). In those jurisdictions, §4 of the Act banned all such tests or devices. §4(a), 79 Stat. 438 . Section 5 provided that no change in voting procedures could take effect until it was approved by federal authorities in Washington, D. C.— either the Attorney General or a court of three judges. Id., at 439 . A jurisdiction could obtain such “preclearance” only by proving that the change had neither “the purpose [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” Ibid. Sections 4 and 5 were intended to be temporary; they were set to expire after five years. See §4(a), id., at 438; Northwest Austin, supra, at 199 . In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, we upheld the 1965 Act against constitutional challenge, explaining that it was justified to address “vot- ing discrimination where it persists on a pervasive scale.” 383 U. S., at 308 . In 1970, Congress reauthorized the Act for another five years, and extended the coverage formula in §4(b) to juris- dictions that had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout as of 1968. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, §§3–4, 84 Stat. 315 . That swept in several counties in California, New Hampshire, and New York. See 28 CFR pt. 51, App. Congress also extended the ban in §4(a) on tests and devices nationwide. §6, 84 Stat. 315 . In 1975, Congress reauthorized the Act for seven more years, and extended its coverage to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration or Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court turnout as of 1972. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, §§101, 202, 89 Stat. 400 , 401. Congress also amend- ed the definition of “test or device” to include the practice of providing English-only voting materials in places where over five percent of voting-age citizens spoke a single language other than English. §203, id., at 401–402. As a result of these amendments, the States of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas, as well as several counties in California, Flor- ida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Da- kota, became covered jurisdictions. See 28 CFR pt. 51, App. Congress correspondingly amended sections 2 and 5 to forbid voting discrimination on the basis of membership in a language minority group, in addition to discrimination on the basis of race or color. §§203, 206, 89 Stat. 401 , 402. Finally, Congress made the nationwide ban on tests and devices permanent. §102, id., at 400. In 1982, Congress reauthorized the Act for 25 years, but did not alter its coverage formula. See Voting Rights Act Amendments, 96 Stat. 131 . Congress did, however, amend the bailout provisions, allowing political subdivisions of covered jurisdictions to bail out. Among other prerequi- sites for bailout, jurisdictions and their subdivisions must not have used a forbidden test or device, failed to receive preclearance, or lost a §2 suit, in the ten years prior to seeking bailout. §2, id., at 131–133. We upheld each of these reauthorizations against con- stitutional challenge. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156 (1980); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U. S. 266 (1999). In 2006, Congress again reauthorized the Voting Rights Act for 25 years, again without change to its coverage formula. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amend- ments Act, 120 Stat. 577 . Congress also amended §5 to prohibit more conduct than before. §5, id., at 580– 6 SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court 581; see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U. S. 320, 341 (2000) (Bossier II); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U. S. 461, 479 (2003). Section 5 now forbids voting changes with “any discriminatory purpose” as well as voting changes that diminish the ability of citizens, on account of race, color, or language minority status, “to elect their preferred candidates of choice.” 42 U. S. C. §§1973c(b)–(d). Shortly after this reauthorization, a Texas utility district brought suit, seeking to bail out from the Act’s cover- age and, in the alternative, challenging the Act’s constitu- tionality. See Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 200–201. A three-judge District Court explained that only a State or political subdivision was eligible to seek bailout under the statute, and concluded that the utility district was not a political subdivision, a term that encompassed only “coun- ties, parishes, and voter-registering subunits.” Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 232 (DC 2008). The District Court also rejected the constitutional challenge. Id., at 283 . We reversed. We explained that “ ‘normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.’ ” North- west Austin, supra, at 205 (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam)). Conclud- ing that “underlying constitutional concerns,” among other things, “compel[led] a broader reading of the bailout provi- sion,” we construed the statute to allow the utility district to seek bailout. Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 207 . In doing so we expressed serious doubts about the Act’s con- tinued constitutionality. We explained that §5 “imposes substantial federalism costs” and “differentiates between the States, despite our his- toric tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.” Id., at 202, 203 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also noted that “[t]hings have changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprece- dented levels.” Id., at 202 . Finally, we questioned whether the problems that §5 meant to address were still “concen- trated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.” Id., at 203. Eight Members of the Court subscribed to these views, and the remaining Member would have held the Act un- constitutional. Ultimately, however, the Court’s construc- tion of the bailout provision left the constitutional issues for another day. B Shelby County is located in Alabama, a covered jurisdic- tion. It has not sought bailout, as the Attorney General has recently objected to voting changes proposed from within the county. See App. 87a–92a. Instead, in 2010, the county sued the Attorney General in Federal District Court in Washington, D. C., seeking a declaratory judg- ment that sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional, as well as a permanent injunc- tion against their enforcement. The District Court ruled against the county and upheld the Act. 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 508 (2011). The court found that the evidence before Congress in 2006 was sufficient to justify reauthorizing §5 and continuing the §4(b) coverage formula. The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit affirmed. In assessing §5, the D. C. Circuit considered six primary categories of evidence: Attorney General objections to voting changes, Attorney General requests for more in- formation regarding voting changes, successful §2 suits in covered jurisdictions, the dispatching of federal observers to monitor elections in covered jurisdictions, §5 preclear- ance suits involving covered jurisdictions, and the deter- rent effect of §5. See 679 F. 3d 848 , 862–863 (2012). After extensive analysis of the record, the court accepted Con- 8 SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court gress’s conclusion that §2 litigation remained inadequate in the covered jurisdictions to protect the rights of minori- ty voters, and that §5 was therefore still necessary. Id., at 873. Turning to §4, the D. C. Circuit noted that the evidence for singling out the covered jurisdictions was “less robust” and that the issue presented “a close question.” Id., at 879. But the court looked to data comparing the number of successful §2 suits in the different parts of the country. Coupling that evidence with the deterrent effect of §5, the court concluded that the statute continued “to single out the jurisdictions in which discrimination is concentrated,” and thus held that the coverage formula passed constitu- tional muster. Id., at 883. Judge Williams dissented. He found “no positive cor- relation between inclusion in §4(b)’s coverage formula and low black registration or turnout.” Id., at 891. Rather, to the extent there was any correlation, it actually went the other way: “condemnation under §4(b) is a marker of higher black registration and turnout.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Judge Williams also found that “[c]overed juris- dictions have far more black officeholders as a proportion of the black population than do uncovered ones.” Id., at 892. As to the evidence of successful §2 suits, Judge Wil- liams disaggregated the reported cases by State, and concluded that “[t]he five worst uncovered jurisdictions . . . have worse records than eight of the covered jurisdic- tions.” Id., at 897. He also noted that two covered juris- dictions—Arizona and Alaska—had not had any successful reported §2 suit brought against them during the entire 24 years covered by the data. Ibid. Judge Williams would have held the coverage formula of §4(b) “irrational” and unconstitutional. Id., at 885. We granted certiorari. 568 U. S. ___ (2012). Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court II In Northwest Austin, we stated that “the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.” 557 U. S., at 203 . And we concluded that “a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty re- quires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” Ibid. These basic principles guide our review of the question before us.1 A The Constitution and laws of the United States are “the supreme Law of the Land.” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. State legislation may not contravene federal law. The Federal Government does not, however, have a general right to review and veto state enactments before they go into effect. A proposal to grant such authority to “nega- tive” state laws was considered at the Constitutional Convention, but rejected in favor of allowing state laws to take effect, subject to later challenge under the Supremacy Clause. See 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 21, 164–168 (M. Farrand ed. 1911); 2 id., at 27–29, 390–392. Outside the strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the Constitu- tion provides that all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or citizens. Amdt. 10. This “allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States.” Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. ___ , ___ —————— 1 Both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were at issue in Northwest Austin, see Juris. Statement i, and Brief for Federal Appel- lee 29–30, in Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, O. T. 2008, No. 08–322, and accordingly Northwest Austin guides our review under both Amendments in this case. 10 SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court (2011) (slip op., at 9). But the federal balance “is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). More specifically, “ ‘the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.’ ” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452 , 461–462 (1991) (quot- ing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 647 (1973); some internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, the Federal Government retains significant control over federal elec- tions. For instance, the Constitution authorizes Congress to establish the time and manner for electing Senators and Representatives. Art. I, §4, cl. 1; see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., ante, at 4–6. But States have “broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.” Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 91 (1965) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Arizona, ante, at 13–15. And “[e]ach State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen.” Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 161 (1892). Drawing lines for congressional districts is likewise “pri- marily the duty and responsibility of the State.” Perry v. Perez, 565 U. S. ___ , ___ (2012) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Consti- tution, there is also a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” among the States. Northwest Austin, supra, at 203 (citing United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 16 (1960); Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845); and Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 , 725–726 (1869); emphasis added). Over a hundred years ago, this Court explained that our Nation “was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority.” Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 567 (1911). Indeed, “the constitutional equality of the Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.” Id., at 580 . Coyle concerned the admission of new States, and Katzenbach rejected the notion that the principle operated as a bar on differential treatment outside that context. 383 U. S., at 328–329. At the same time, as we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subse- quent disparate treatment of States. 557 U. S., at 203 . The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It suspends “all changes to state election law— however innocuous—until they have been precleared by federal authorities in Washington, D. C.” Id., at 202 . States must beseech the Federal Government for permis- sion to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own, subject of course to any injunction in a §2 action. The Attorney General has 60 days to object to a preclearance request, longer if he requests more information. See 28 CFR §§51.9 , 51.37. If a State seeks preclearance from a three- judge court, the process can take years. And despite the tradition of equal sovereignty, the Act applies to only nine States (and several additional coun- ties). While one State waits months or years and expends funds to implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor can typically put the same law into effect immediately, through the normal legislative process. Even if a noncov- ered jurisdiction is sued, there are important differences between those proceedings and preclearance proceedings; the preclearance proceeding “not only switches the burden of proof to the supplicant jurisdiction, but also applies substantive standards quite different from those govern- ing the rest of the nation.” 679 F. 3d, at 884 (Williams, J., dissenting) (case below). All this explains why, when we first upheld the Act in 1966, we described it as “stringent” and “potent.” Katzen- 12 SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court bach, 383 U. S., at 308, 315, 337 . We recognized that it “may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power,” but concluded that “legislative measures not oth- erwise appropriate” could be justified by “exceptional con- ditions.” Id., at 334 . We have since noted that the Act “authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking,” Lopez, 525 U. S., at 282 , and represents an “extraordinary departure from the tradi- tional course of relations between the States and the Federal Government,” Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U. S. 491 , 500–501 (1992). As we reiterated in Northwest Austin, the Act constitutes “extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system.” 557 U. S., at 211 . B In 1966, we found these departures from the basic fea- tures of our system of government justified. The “blight of racial discrimination in voting” had “infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.” Katzenbach,

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. *534 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem. Section 5 *535 of the Act required States to obtain federal permission before enacting any law related to voting-a drastic departure from basic principles of federalism. And § 4 of the Act applied that requirement only to some States-an equally dramatic departure from the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty. This was strong medicine, but Congress determined it was needed to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting, "an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 , 309, 86 S.Ct. 803 , 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). As we explained in upholding the law, "exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate." Id., at 334 , 86 S.Ct. 803 . Reflecting the unprecedented nature of these measures, they were scheduled to expire after five years. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 . Nearly 50 years later, they are still in effect; indeed, they have been made more stringent, and are now scheduled to last until 2031. There is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions. By 2009, "the racial gap in voter registration and turnout [was] lower in the States originally *2619 covered by § 5 than it [was] nationwide." Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 , 203-204, 129 S.Ct. 2504 , 174 L.Ed.2d 140 (2009). Since that time, Census Bureau data indicate that African-American voter turnout has come to exceed white voter turnout in five of the six States originally covered by § 5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one half of one percent. See Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, for States (Nov. 2012) (Table 4b). *536 At the same time, voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that. The question is whether the Act's extraordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of the States, continue to satisfy constitutional requirements. As we put it a short time ago, "the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs." Northwest Austin, 557 U.S., at 203 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 . I A The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, in the wake of the Civil War. It provides that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," and it gives Congress the "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." "The first century of congressional enforcement of the Amendment, however, can only be regarded as a failure." Id., at 197 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 . In the 1890s, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia began to enact literacy tests for voter registration and to employ other methods designed to prevent African-Americans from voting. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 310 , 86 S.Ct. 803 . Congress passed statutes outlawing some of these practices and facilitating litigation against them, but litigation remained slow and expensive, and the States came up with new ways to discriminate as soon as existing ones were struck down. Voter registration of African-Americans barely improved. Id., at 313-314 , 86 S.Ct. 803 . Inspired to action by the civil rights movement, Congress responded in 1965 with the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 was enacted to forbid, in all 50 States, any "standard, practice, or procedure ... imposed or applied ... to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." 79 Stat. 437 . The current *537 version forbids any " standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (a). Both the Federal Government and individuals have sued to enforce § 2, see, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 , 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994), and injunctive relief is available in appropriate cases to block voting laws from going into effect, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d). Section 2 is permanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case. Other sections targeted only some parts of the country. At the time of the Act's passage, these "covered" jurisdictions were those States or political subdivisions that had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election. § 4(b), 79 Stat. 438 . Such tests or devices included literacy and knowledge tests, good moral character requirements, the need for vouchers from registered voters, and the like. § 4(c), id ., at 438-439 . A *2620 covered jurisdiction could "bail out" of coverage if it had not used a test or device in the preceding five years "for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." § 4(a), id., at 438 . In 1965, the covered States included Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia. The additional covered subdivisions included 39 counties in North Carolina and one in Arizona. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. (2012). In those jurisdictions, § 4 of the Act banned all such tests or devices. § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 . Section 5 provided that no change in voting procedures could take effect until it was approved by federal authorities in Washington, D.C.-either the Attorney General or a court of three judges. Id., at 439 . A jurisdiction could obtain such "preclearance" only by proving that the change had neither "the purpose [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid . *538 Sections 4 and 5 were intended to be temporary; they were set to expire after five years. See § 4(a), id., at 438 ; Northwest Austin, supra, at 199 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 . In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, we upheld the 1965 Act against constitutional challenge, explaining that it was justified to address "voting discrimination where it persists on a pervasive scale." 383 U.S., at 308 , 86 S.Ct. 803 . In 1970, Congress reauthorized the Act for another five years, and extended the coverage formula in § 4(b) to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout as of 1968. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, §§ 3-4, 84 Stat. 315 . That swept in several counties in California, New Hampshire, and New York. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. Congress also extended the ban in § 4(a) on tests and devices nationwide. § 6, 84 Stat. 315 . In 1975, Congress reauthorized the Act for seven more years, and extended its coverage to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout as of 1972. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, §§ 101, 202, 89 Stat. 400 , 401. Congress also amended the definition of "test or device" to include the practice of providing English-only voting materials in places where over five percent of voting-age citizens spoke a single language other than English. § 203, id., at 401-402 . As a result of these amendments, the States of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas, as well as several counties in California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota, became covered jurisdictions. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. Congress correspondingly amended sections 2 and 5 to forbid voting discrimination on the basis of membership in a language minority group, in addition to discrimination on the basis of race or color. §§ 203, 206, 89 Stat. 401 , 402. Finally, Congress made the nationwide ban on tests and devices permanent. § 102, id ., at 400. In 1982, Congress reauthorized the Act for 25 years, but did not alter its coverage formula. See Voting Rights Act *539 Amendments, 96 Stat. 131 . Congress did, however, amend the bailout provisions, allowing political subdivisions of covered jurisdictions to bail out. Among other prerequisites for bailout, jurisdictions and their subdivisions must not have used a forbidden test or device, failed to receive preclearance, or lost a § 2 suit, in the ten years prior to seeking bailout. § 2, id., at 131-133 . We upheld each of these reauthorizations against constitutional challenge. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 , 93 S.Ct. 1702 , 36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973) ; City of *2621 Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 , 100 S.Ct. 1548 , 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980) ; Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 , 119 S.Ct. 693 , 142 L.Ed.2d 728 (1999). In 2006, Congress again reauthorized the Voting Rights Act for 25 years, again without change to its coverage formula. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act, 120 Stat. 577 . Congress also amended § 5 to prohibit more conduct than before. § 5, id., at 580-581 ; see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320 , 341, 120 S.Ct. 866 , 145 L.Ed.2d 845 (2000) ( Bossier II ); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 , 479, 123 S.Ct. 2498 , 156 L.Ed.2d 428 (2003). Section 5 now forbids voting changes with "any discriminatory purpose" as well as voting changes that diminish the ability of citizens, on account of race, color, or language minority status, "to elect their preferred candidates of choice." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c(b)-(d). Shortly after this reauthorization, a Texas utility district brought suit, seeking to bail out from the Act's coverage and, in the alternative, challenging the Act's constitutionality. See Northwest Austin, 557 U.S., at 200 -201 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 . A three-judge District Court explained that only a State or political subdivision was eligible to seek bailout under the statute, and concluded that the utility district was not a political subdivision, a term that encompassed only "counties, parishes, and voter-registering subunits." Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F.Supp.2d 221 , 232 (D.D.C.2008). The District Court also rejected the constitutional challenge. Id., at 283 . *540 We reversed. We explained that " 'normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.' " Northwest Austin, supra, at 205 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48 , 51, 104 S.Ct. 1577 , 80 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984) ( per curiam )). Concluding that "underlying constitutional concerns," among other things, "compel[led] a broader reading of the bailout provision," we construed the statute to allow the utility district to seek bailout. Northwest Austin, 557 U.S., at 207 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 . In doing so we expressed serious doubts about the Act's continued constitutionality. We explained that § 5 "imposes substantial federalism costs" and "differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty." Id., at 202, 203 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also noted that "[t]hings have changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels." Id., at 202 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 . Finally, we questioned whether the problems that § 5 meant to address were still "concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance." Id., at 203 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 . Eight Members of the Court subscribed to these views, and the remaining Member would have held the Act unconstitutional. Ultimately, however, the Court's construction of the bailout provision left the constitutional issues for another day. B Shelby County is located in Alabama, a covered jurisdiction. It has not sought bailout, as the Attorney General has recently objected to voting changes proposed from within the county. See App. 87a-92a. Instead, in 2010, the county sued the Attorney General in Federal District Court in Washington, D.C., seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 *2622 of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional, as well as a permanent injunction against their *541 enforcement. The District Court ruled against the county and upheld the Act. 811 F.Supp.2d 424 , 508 (2011). The court found that the evidence before Congress in 2006 was sufficient to justify reauthorizing § 5 and continuing the § 4(b) coverage formula. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. In assessing § 5, the D.C. Circuit considered six primary categories of evidence: Attorney General objections to voting changes, Attorney General requests for more information regarding voting changes, successful § 2 suits in covered jurisdictions, the dispatching of federal observers to monitor elections in covered jurisdictions, § 5 preclearance suits involving covered jurisdictions, and the deterrent effect of § 5. See 679 F.3d 848 , 862-863 (2012). After extensive analysis of the record, the court accepted Congress's conclusion that § 2 litigation remained inadequate in the covered jurisdictions to protect the rights of minority voters, and that § 5 was therefore still necessary. Id., at 873 . Turning to § 4, the D.C. Circuit noted that the evidence for singling out the covered jurisdictions was "less robust" and that the issue presented "a close question." Id., at 879 . But the court looked to data comparing the number of successful § 2 suits in the different parts of the country. Coupling that evidence with the deterrent effect of § 5, the court concluded that the statute continued "to single out the jurisdictions in which discrimination is concentrated," and thus held that the coverage formula passed constitutional muster. Id., at 883 . Judge Williams dissented. He found "no positive correlation between inclusion in § 4(b)'s coverage formula and low black registration or turnout." Id., at 891 . Rather, to the extent there was any correlation, it actually went the other way: "condemnation under § 4(b) is a marker of higher black registration and turnout." Ibid. (emphasis added). Judge Williams also found that "[c]overed jurisdictions have far more black officeholders as a proportion of the black *542 population than do uncovered ones." Id., at 892 . As to the evidence of successful § 2 suits, Judge Williams disaggregated the reported cases by State, and concluded that "[t]he five worst uncovered jurisdictions ... have worse records than eight of the covered jurisdictions." Id., at 897 . He also noted that two covered jurisdictions-Arizona and Alaska-had not had any successful reported § 2 suit brought against them during the entire 24 years covered by the data. Ibid. Judge Williams would have held the coverage formula of § 4(b) "irrational" and unconstitutional. Id., at 885 . We granted certiorari. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 594 , 184 L.Ed.2d 389 (2012). II In Northwest Austin , we stated that "the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs." 557 U.S., at 203 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 . And we concluded that "a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets." Ibid. These basic principles guide our review of the question before us. 1 *2623 A The Constitution and laws of the United States are "the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. State legislation may not contravene federal law. The Federal Government does not, however, have a general right to review and veto state enactments before they go into effect. A proposal to grant such authority to "negative" state laws was considered at the Constitutional Convention, but rejected in favor of allowing state laws to take effect, subject to later challenge under the Supremacy Clause. See 1 *543 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 21, 164-168 (M. Farrand ed. 1911); 2 id., at 27-29, 390-392. Outside the strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the Constitution provides that all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or citizens. Amdt. 10. This "allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States." Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2355 , 2364, 180 L.Ed.2d 269 (2011). But the federal balance "is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). More specifically, " 'the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.' " Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 , 461-462, 111 S.Ct. 2395 , 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 , 647, 93 S.Ct. 2842 , 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973) ; some internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, the Federal Government retains significant control over federal elections. For instance, the Constitution authorizes Congress to establish the time and manner for electing Senators and Representatives. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., --- U.S., at ---- - ----, 133 S.Ct., at 2253 - 2254. But States have "broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised." Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 , 91, 85 S.Ct. 775 , 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Arizona, ante, at --- U.S., at ---- - ----, 133 S.Ct., at 2257 - 2259. And "[e]ach State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen." Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 , 161, 12 S.Ct. 375 , 36 L.Ed. 103 (1892). Drawing lines for congressional districts is likewise "primarily the duty and responsibility of the State." Perry v. Perez,</

Justice THOMAS, concurring. I join the Court's opinion in full but write separately to explain that I would find § 5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as well. The Court's opinion sets forth the reasons. "The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem." Ante, at 2618. In the face of "unremitting and ingenious defiance" of citizens' constitutionally protected right to vote, § 5 was necessary to give effect to the Fifteenth Amendment in particular regions of the country. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 , 309, 86 S.Ct. 803 , 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). Though § 5's preclearance *558 requirement represented a "shar[p] depart[ure]" from "basic principles" of federalism and the equal sovereignty of the States, ante, at 2622, 2623, the Court upheld the measure against early constitutional challenges because it was necessary at the time to address "voting discrimination where it persist[ed] on a pervasive scale." Katzenbach, supra, at 308 , 86 S.Ct. 803 . Today, our Nation has changed. "[T]he conditions that originally justified [§ 5] no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions." Ante, at 2618. As the Court explains: " '[V]oter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.' " Ante, at 2625 (quoting *2632 Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 , 202, 129 S.Ct. 2504 , 174 L.Ed.2d 140 (2009) ). In spite of these improvements, however, Congress increased the already significant burdens of § 5. Following its reenactment in 2006, the Voting Rights Act was amended to "prohibit more conduct than before." Ante, at 2621. "Section 5 now forbids voting changes with 'any discriminatory purpose' as well as voting changes that diminish the ability of citizens, on account of race, color, or language minority status, 'to elect their preferred candidates of choice.' " Ante, at 2621. While the pre-2006 version of the Act went well beyond protection guaranteed under the Constitution, see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471 , 480-482, 117 S.Ct. 1491 , 137 L.Ed.2d 730 (1997), it now goes even further. It is, thus, quite fitting that the Court repeatedly points out that this legislation is "extraordinary" and "unprecedented" and recognizes the significant constitutional problems created by Congress' decision to raise "the bar that covered jurisdictions must clear," even as "the conditions justifying that requirement have dramatically improved." Ante, at 2627. However one aggregates the data compiled by Congress, it cannot justify the considerable burdens created by § 5. As the Court aptly notes: "[N]o one can fairly say that [the record] shows anything approaching the 'pervasive,' 'flagrant,' 'widespread,' and 'rampant' discrimination *559 that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time." Ante, at 2629. Indeed, circumstances in the covered jurisdictions can no longer be characterized as "exceptional" or "unique." "The extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to previously uphold § 5 as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment no longer exists." Northwest Austin, supra, at 226 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Section 5 is, thus, unconstitutional. While the Court claims to "issue no holding on § 5 itself," ante, at 2631, its own opinion compellingly demonstrates that Congress has failed to justify " 'current burdens' " with a record demonstrating " 'current needs.' " See ante, at 2622 (quoting Northwest Austin, supra, at 203 , 129 S.Ct. 2504 ). By leaving the inevitable conclusion unstated, the Court needlessly prolongs the demise of that provision. For the reasons stated in the Court's opinion, I would find § 5 unconstitutional. Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice BREYER, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting. In the Court's view, the very success of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act demands its dormancy. Congress was of another mind. Recognizing that large progress has been made, Congress determined, based on a voluminous record, that the scourge of discrimination was not yet extirpated. The question this case presents is who decides whether, as currently operative, § 5 remains justifiable, 1 this Court, or a Congress charged with the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War Amendments "by appropriate legislation." With overwhelming support in both Houses, Congress concluded that, for two prime reasons, § 5 should continue in force, unabated. First, continuance would facilitate completion of the impressive gains thus far made; and second, continuance would *560 guard against backsliding. Those assessments were well within Congress' province to make and *2633 should elicit this Court's unstinting approbation. I "[V]oting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that." Ante, at 2619. But the Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be best suited to block that discrimination. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) has worked to combat voting discrimination where other remedies had been tried and failed. Particularly effective is the VRA's requirement of federal preclearance for all changes to voting laws in the regions of the country with the most aggravated records of rank discrimination against minority voting rights. A century after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments guaranteed citizens the right to vote free of discrimination on the basis of race, the "blight of racial discrimination in voting" continued to "infec[t] the electoral process in parts of our country." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 , 308, 86 S.Ct. 803 , 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). Early attempts to cope with this vile infection resembled battling the Hydra. Whenever one form of voting discrimination was identified and prohibited, others sprang up in its place. This Court repeatedly encountered the remarkable "variety and persistence" of laws disenfranchising minority citizens. Id., at 311 , 86 S.Ct. 803 . To take just one example, the Court, in 1927, held unconstitutional a Texas law barring black voters from participating in primary elections, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 , 541, 47 S.Ct. 446 , 71 L.Ed. 759 ; in 1944, the Court struck down a "reenacted" and slightly altered version of the same law, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 , 658, 64 S.Ct. 757 , 88 L.Ed. 987 ; and in 1953, the Court once again confronted an attempt by Texas to "circumven[t]" the Fifteenth Amendment by adopting yet another variant of the all-white primary, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 , 469, 73 S.Ct. 809 , 97 L.Ed. 1152 . *561 During this era, the Court recognized that discrimination against minority voters was a quintessentially political problem requiring a political solution. As Justice Holmes explained: If "the great mass of the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting," "relief from [that] great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department of the government of the United States." Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 , 488, 23 S.Ct. 639 , 47 L.Ed. 909 (1903). Congress learned from experience that laws targeting particular electoral practices or enabling case-by-case litigation were inadequate to the task. In the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, Congress authorized and then expanded the power of "the Attorney General to seek injunctions against public and private interference with the right to vote on racial grounds." Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 313 , 86 S.Ct. 803 . But circumstances reduced the ameliorative potential of these legislative Acts: "Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes requiring as many as 6,000 man-hours spent combing through registration records in preparation for trial. Litigation has been exceedingly slow, in part because of the ample opportunities for delay afforded voting officials and others involved in the proceedings. Even when favorable decisions have finally been obtained, some of the States affected have merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity between white and Negro registration. Alternatively, certain local officials have defied *2634 and evaded court orders or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls." Id., at 314 , 86 S.Ct. 803 (footnote omitted). Patently, a new approach was needed. *562 Answering that need, the Voting Rights Act became one of the most consequential, efficacious, and amply justified exercises of federal legislative power in our Nation's history. Requiring federal preclearance of changes in voting laws in the covered jurisdictions-those States and localities where opposition to the Constitution's commands were most virulent-the VRA provided a fit solution for minority voters as well as for States. Under the preclearance regime established by § 5 of the VRA, covered jurisdictions must submit proposed changes in voting laws or procedures to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which has 60 days to respond to the changes. 79 Stat. 439 , codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). A change will be approved unless DOJ finds it has "the purpose [or] ... the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. In the alternative, the covered jurisdiction may seek approval by a three-judge District Court in the District of Columbia. After a century's failure to fulfill the promise of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, passage of the VRA finally led to signal improvement on this front. "The Justice Department estimated that in the five years after [the VRA's] passage, almost as many blacks registered [to vote] in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina as in the entire century before 1965." Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in Controversies in Minority Voting 7, 21 (B. Grofman & C. Davidson eds. 1992). And in assessing the overall effects of the VRA in 2006, Congress found that "[s]ignificant progress has been made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority voters, including increased numbers of registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress, State legislatures, and local elected offices. This progress is the direct result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965." Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and *563 Amendments Act of 2006 (hereinafter 2006 Reauthorization), § 2(b) (1), 120 Stat. 577 . On that matter of cause and effects there can be no genuine doubt. Although the VRA wrought dramatic changes in the realization of minority voting rights, the Act, to date, surely has not eliminated all vestiges of discrimination against the exercise of the franchise by minority citizens. Jurisdictions covered by the preclearance requirement continued to submit, in large numbers, proposed changes to voting laws that the Attorney General declined to approve, auguring that barriers to minority voting would quickly resurface were the preclearance remedy eliminated. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 , 181, 100 S.Ct. 1548 , 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980). Congress also found that as "registration and voting of minority citizens increas[ed], other measures may be resorted to which would dilute increasing minority voting strength." Ibid. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-196, p. 10 (1975)). See also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 , 640, 113 S.Ct. 2816 , 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) ("[I]t soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices" such as voting dilution). Efforts to reduce the impact of minority votes, in contrast to direct attempts to block access to the ballot, are aptly described as "second-generation barriers" to minority voting. *2635 Second-generation barriers come in various forms. One of the blockages is racial gerrymandering, the redrawing of legislative districts in an "effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting." Id., at 642 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 . Another is adoption of a system of at-large voting in lieu of district-by-district voting in a city with a sizable black minority. By switching to at-large voting, the overall majority could control the election of each city council member, effectively eliminating the potency of the minority's votes. Grofman & Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election Structure on Black Representation in Eight Southern States, in Quiet Revolution in the *564 South 301, 319 (C. Davidson & B. Grofman eds. 1994) (hereinafter Quiet Revolution). A similar effect could be achieved if the city engaged in discriminatory annexation by incorporating majority-white areas into city limits, thereby decreasing the effect of VRA-occasioned increases in black voting. Whatever the device employed, this Court has long recognized that vote dilution, when adopted with a discriminatory purpose, cuts down the right to vote as certainly as denial of access to the ballot. Shaw, 509 U.S., at 640 -641 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 ; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 , 569, 89 S.Ct. 817 , 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). See also H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, p. 6 (2006) (although "[d]iscrimination today is more subtle than the visible methods used in 1965," "the effect and results are the same, namely a diminishing of the minority community's ability to fully participate in the electoral process and to elect their preferred candidates"). In response to evidence of these substituted barriers, Congress reauthorized the VRA for five years in 1970, for seven years in 1975, and for 25 years in 1982. Ante, at 2620 - 2621. Each time, this Court upheld the reauthorization as a valid exercise of congressional power. Ante, at 2620. As the 1982 reauthorization approached its 2007 expiration date, Congress again considered whether the VRA's preclearance mechanism remained an appropriate response to the problem of voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions. Congress did not take this task lightly. Quite the opposite. The 109th Congress that took responsibility for the renewal started early and conscientiously. In October 2005, the House began extensive hearings, which continued into November and resumed in March 2006. S.Rep. No. 109-295, p. 2 (2006). In April 2006, the Senate followed suit, with hearings of its own. Ibid. In May 2006, the bills that became the VRA's reauthorization were introduced in both Houses. Ibid. The House held further hearings of considerable length, as did the Senate, which continued to hold hearings into June and July. H.R. Rep. 109-478, at 5 ; *565 S. Rep. 109-295, at 3-4. In mid-July, the House considered and rejected four amendments, then passed the reauthorization by a vote of 390 yeas to 33 nays. 152 Cong. Rec. H5207 (July 13, 2006); Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L.J. 174 , 182-183 (2007) (hereinafter Persily). The bill was read and debated in the Senate, where it passed by a vote of 98 to 0. 152 Cong. Rec. S8012 (July 20, 2006). President Bush signed it a week later, on July 27, 2006, recognizing the need for "further work ... in the fight against injustice," and calling the reauthorization "an example of our continued commitment to a united America where every person is valued and treated with dignity and respect." 152 Cong. Rec. S8781 (Aug. 3, 2006). In the long course of the legislative process, Congress "amassed a sizable record." *2636 Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 , 205, 129 S.Ct. 2504 , 174 L.Ed.2d 140 (2009). See also 679 F.3d 848 , 865-873 (C.A.D.C.2012) (describing the "extensive record" supporting Congress' determination that "serious and widespread intentional discrimination persisted in covered jurisdictions"). The House and Senate Judiciary Committees held 21 hearings, heard from scores of witnesses, received a number of investigative reports and other written documentation of continuing discrimination in covered jurisdictions. In all, the legislative record Congress compiled filled more than 15,000 pages. H.R. Rep. 109-478, at 5, 11-12 ; S. Rep. 109-295, at 2-4, 15. The compilation presents countless "examples of flagrant racial discrimination" since the last reauthorization; Congress also brought to light systematic evidence that "intentional racial discrimination in voting remains so serious and widespread in covered jurisdictions that section 5 preclearance is still needed." 679 F.3d, at 866 . After considering the full legislative record, Congress made the following findings: The VRA has directly caused significant progress in eliminating first-generation barriers to ballot access, leading to a marked increase in minority *566 voter registration and turnout and the number of minority elected officials. 2006 Reauthorization § 2(b)(1). But despite this progress, "second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully participating in the electoral process" continued to exist, as well as racially polarized voting in the covered jurisdictions, which increased the political vulnerability of racial and language minorities in those jurisdictions. §§ 2(b)(2)-(3), 120 Stat. 577 . Extensive "[e]vidence of continued discrimination," Congress concluded, "clearly show[ed] the continued need for Federal oversight" in covered jurisdictions. §§ 2(b)(4)-(5), id., at 577-578 . The overall record demonstrated to the federal lawmakers that, "without the continuation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial and language minority citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the last 40 years." § 2(b)(9), id., at 578 . Based on these findings, Congress reauthorized preclearance for another 25 years, while also undertaking to reconsider the extension after 15 years to ensure that the provision was still necessary and effective. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(7), (8) (2006 ed., Supp. V). The question before the Court is whether Congress had the authority under the Constitution to act as it did. II In answering this question, the Court does not write on a clean slate. It is well established that Congress' judgment regarding exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants substantial deference. The VRA addresses the combination of race discrimination and the right to vote, which is "preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 , 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). When confronting the most constitutionally invidious form of discrimination, and the most fundamental right in our democratic system, Congress' power to act is at its height. *567 The basis for this deference is firmly rooted in both constitutional text and precedent. The Fifteenth Amendment, which targets precisely and only racial discrimination in voting rights, states that, in this domain, "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." 2 In choosing this language, the *2637 Amendment's framers invoked Chief Justice Marshall's formulation of the scope of Congress' powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 , 421, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819) (emphasis added). It cannot tenably be maintained that the VRA, an Act of Congress adopted to shield the right to vote from racial discrimination, is inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment, or any provision of the Constitution read in light of the Civil War Amendments. Nowhere in today's opinion, or in Northwest Austin, 3 is there clear recognition of the transformative effect the Fifteenth Amendment aimed to achieve. Notably, "the Founders' first successful amendment told Congress that it could 'make no law' over a *568 certain domain"; in contrast, the Civil War Amendments used " language [that] authorized transformative new federal statutes to uproot all vestiges of unfreedom and inequality" and provided "sweeping enforcement powers ... to enact 'appropriate' legislation targeting state abuses." A. Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 361, 363, 399 (2005). See also McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L.Rev. 153 , 182 (1997) (quoting Civil War-era framer that "the remedy for the violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the courts. The remedy was legislative."). The stated purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to arm Congress with the power and authority to protect all persons within the Nation from violations of their rights by the States. In exercising that power, then, Congress may use "all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted" to the constitutional ends declared by these Amendments. McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 421 . So when Congress acts to enforce the right to vote free from racial discrimination, we ask not whether Congress has chosen the means most wise, but whether Congress has rationally selected means appropriate to a legitimate end. "It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of [the need for its chosen remedy]. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 653, 86 S.Ct. 1717 , 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966). Until today, in considering the constitutionality of the VRA, the Court has accorded Congress the full measure of respect its *2638 judgments in this domain should garner. South Carolina v. Katzenbach supplies the standard of review: "As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting." 383 U.S., at 324 , 86 S.Ct. 803 . Faced with subsequent reauthorizations of the VRA, the *569 Court has reaffirmed this standard. E.g., City of Rome, 446 U.S., at 178 , 100 S.Ct. 1548 . Today's Court does not purport to alter settled precedent establishing that the dispositive question is whether Congress has employed "rational means." For three reasons, legislation re authorizing an existing statute is especially likely to satisfy the minimal requirements of the rational-basis test. First, when reauthorization is at issue, Congress has already assembled a legislative record justifying the initial legislation. Congress is entitled to consider that preexisting record as well as the record before it at the time of the vote on reauthorization. This is especially true where, as here, the Court has repeatedly affirmed the statute's constitutionality and Congress has adhered to the very model the Court has upheld. See id., at 174 , 100 S.Ct. 1548 ("The appellants are asking us to do nothing less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach ..., in which we upheld the constitutionality of the Act."); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 , 283,