Ex Parte Milligan (1866)

71 U.S. 2 (____) 4 Wall. 2 EX PARTE MILLIGAN. Supreme Court of United States. *9 Mr. J.E. McDonald, Mr. J.S. Black, Mr. J.H. Garfield, and Mr. David Dudley Field, for the petitioner. Mr. Speed, A.G., Mr. Stanbery, and Mr. B.F. Butler, special counsel of the United States, contra. ON THE SIDE OF THE UNITED STATES. I. JURISDICTION. 1. As to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. — The record shows that the application was made to the court in open *10 session. The language of the third section contemplates that it shall be made to a "judge." But, independently of this, the record does not state the facts necessary to bring the case within the act of 1863. It does not show under which section of the act it is presented; nor allege that the petitioners are state or political prisoners otherwise than as prisoners of war; nor that a list has been brought in, or that it has not been brought in. If a list had been brought in containing the name of one of these petitioners, it would have been the judge's duty to inquire into his imprisonment; if no list had been brought in, his case could only be brought before the court by some petition, and the judge, upon being satisfied that the allegations of the petition were true, would discharge him. But there is no certificate in the division of opinion that the judges were or were not satisfied that the allegations of these petitioners were true; nor were the petitions brought under the provisions of that duty. But conceding, for argument's sake, this point, a graver question exists. 2. As to the jurisdiction of this court. — If there is any jurisdiction over the case here, it must arise under the acts of Congress which give to this court jurisdiction to take cognizance of questions arising in cases pending in a Circuit Court of the United States and certified to the court for its decision, and then to be remanded to the Circuit Court. This is appellate jurisdiction, and is defined and limited by the single section of the act of April 29, 1802. The case is not within the provisions of this section. First. The question in the court below arose upon the application for a habeas corpus, before there was a service upon the parties having the petitioner in custody, before an answer was made by those parties, before the writ was ordered or issued, while yet there was no other party before the court, except the petitioner. The case was then an ex parte case, and is so still. The proceeding had not yet ripened into a "cause." No division of opinion in such a case is within the purview of the section. The division of opinion on which this *11 court can act, must occur in the progress of a case where the parties on both sides are before the court, or have a status in the case. The right to send the question or point of division to this court can only arise upon the motion of the parties, or either of them, — not by the court on its own motion or for its own convenience. The record hardly exhibits the Attorney of the United States, Mr. Hanna, as taking any part. The parties have an equal right to be heard upon the question in the court below. It must appear to them in open court that the judges are divided in opinion. They must have an equal right to move for its transfer to this court. They must have an equal opportunity to follow it here and to argue it here, — not as volunteers, not as amici curiœ, not by permission, but as parties on the record, with equal rights. This record shows no parties, except the petitioner. Its title is Ex parte Milligan. The persons who are charged in the petition as having him in wrongful custody are not made parties, and had, when the question arose, no right to be heard as parties in the court below, and have no right to be heard as parties in this court. In such a case, this court cannot answer any one of the questions sent here, especially the one, "Had the Military Commission jurisdiction to try and condemn Milligan?" For if the court answer that question in the negative, its answer is a final decision, and, as it is asserted, settles it for all the future of the case below; and when, hereafter, that case shall, in its progress, bring the parties complained of before the court, silences all argument upon the vital point so decided. [*] What becomes of the whole argument which will be made on the other side, of the right of every man before being condemned of crime, to be heard and tried by an impartial jury? Second. This being an ex parte application for a writ of habeas corpus made to a court, the division of opinion then occurring was in effect a decision of the case. *12 The case was ended when the court declined to issue the writ. It was not a division of opinion occurring in the progress of a case or the trial of a case, and when it was announced to the petitioner that one judge was in favor of granting the writ, and that the other would not grant it — that settled and ended the case. The case had not arisen within the meaning of the statute, when from necessity the case and the progress of the case must stop until the question should be decided. And as Milligan was sentenced to be hanged on the 19th May, for aught that appears, we are discussing a question relating to the liberty of a dead man. Having been sentenced to be hanged on the 19th, the presumption is that he was hanged on that day. Any answer to the questions raised will therefore be answers to moot points — answers which courts will not give. [*] Third. If the parties had all been before the court below, and the case in progress, and then the questions certified, and the parties were now here, the court would not answer these questions. 1. Every question involves matters of fact not stated in an agreed case, or admitted on demurrer, but alleged by one of the parties, and standing alone on his ex parte statement. [†] 2. All the facts bearing on the questions are not set forth, so that even if the parties had made an agreed state of facts, yet if this court find that other facts important to be known before a decision of the question do not appear, the questions will not be answered. [‡] 3. The main question certified, the one, as the counsel for the petitioners assert, on which the other two depend, had not yet arisen for decision, especially for final decision, so that if the parties had both concurred in sending that question here, this court could not decide it. If it be said this question did arise upon the application for the writ, it did not then arise for final decision, but only as showing probable cause, leaving it open and undecided *13 until the answer should be made to the writ. A case, upon application for the writ of habeas corpus, has no status as a case until the service of the writ on the party having the petitioner in custody, and his return and the production of the body of the petitioner. No issue arises until there is a return, and when that is made the issue arises upon it, and in the courts of the United States it is conclusive as to the facts contained in the return. [*] 4. The uniform practice in this court is against its jurisdiction in such a case as this upon ex parte proceedings. All the cases (some twenty in number) before this court, on certificates of division, during all the time that this jurisdiction has existed, are cases between parties, and stated in the usual formula of A. v. B., or B. ad sectam A. So, too, all the rules of this court as to the rights and duties of parties in cases before this court, exclude the idea of an ex parte case under the head of appellate jurisdiction. II. THE MERITS OR MAIN QUESTION. Mr. Speed, A.G., and Mr. Butler: By the settled practice of the courts of the United States, upon application for a writ of habeas corpus, if it appear upon the facts stated by the petitioner, all of which shall be taken to be true, that he could not be discharged upon a return of the writ, then no writ will be issued. Therefore the questions resolve themselves into two: I. Had the military commission jurisdiction to hear and determine the case submitted to it? II. The jurisdiction failing, had the military authorities of the United States a right, at the time of filing the petition, to detain the petitioner in custody as a military prisoner, or for trial before a civil court? 1. A military commission derives its powers and authority wholly from martial law; and by that law and by military authority only are its proceedings to be judged or reviewed. [†] *14 2. Marital law is the will of the commanding officer of an armed force, or of a geographical military department, expressed in time of war within the limits of his military jurisdiction, as necessity demands and prudence dictates, restrained or enlarged by the orders of his military chief, or supreme executive ruler. [*] 3. Military law is the rules and regulations made by the legislative power of the State for the government of its land and naval forces. [†] 4. The laws of war (when this expression is not used as a generic term) are the laws which govern the conduct of belligerents towards each other and other nations, flagranti bello. These several kinds of laws should not be confounded, as their adjudications are referable to distinct and different tribunals. Infractions of the laws of war can only be punished or remedied by retaliation, negotiation, or an appeal to the opinion of nations. Offences against military laws are determined by tribunals established in the acts of the legislature which create these laws — such as courts martial and courts of inquiry. The officer executing martial law is at the same time supreme legislator, supreme judge, and supreme executive. As necessity makes his will the law, he only can define and declare it; and whether or not it is infringed, and of the extent of the infraction, he alone can judge; and his sole order punishes or acquits the alleged offender. But the necessities and effects of warlike operations which create the law also give power incidental to its execution. It would be impossible for the commanding general of an army to investigate each fact which might be supposed to interfere with his movements, endanger his safety, aid his enemy, or bring disorder and crime into the community under his charge. He, therefore, must commit to his officers, *15 and in practice, to a board of officers, as a tribunal, by whatever name it may be called, the charge of examining the circumstances and reporting the facts in each particular case, and of advising him as to its disposition — the whole matter to be then determined and executed by his order. [*] Hence arise military commissions, to investigate and determine, not offences against military law by soldiers and sailors, not breaches of the common laws of war by belligerents, but the quality of the acts which are the proper subject of restraint by martial law. Martial law and its tribunals have thus come to be recognized in the military operations of all civilized warfare. Washington, in the Revolutionary war, had repeated recourse to military commissions. General Scott resorted to them as instruments with which to govern the people of Mexico within his lines. They are familiarly recognized in express terms by the acts of Congress of July 17th, 1862, chap. 201, sec. 5; March 18th, 1863, chap. 75, sec. 36; Resolution No. 18, March 11th, 1862; and their jurisdiction over certain offences is also recognized by these acts. But, as has been seen, military commissions do not thus derive their authority. Neither is their jurisdiction confined to the classes of offences therein enumerated. Assuming the jurisdiction where military operations are being in fact carried on, over classes of military offences, Congress, by this legislation, from considerations of public safety, has endeavored to extend the sphere of that jurisdiction over certain offenders who were beyond what might be supposed to be the limit of actual military occupation. As the war progressed, being a civil war, not unlikely, as the facts in this record abundantly show, to break out in any portion of the Union, in any form of insurrection, the President, as commander-in-chief, by his proclamation of September 24th, 1862, ordered: "That during the existing insurrection, and as a necessary *16 means for suppressing the same, all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to rebels, against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by courts martial or military commission. "Second. That the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who now, or hereafter during the Rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or military commission." This was an exercise of his sovereignty in carrying on war, which is vested by the Constitution in the President. [*] This proclamation, which by its terms was to continue during the then existing insurrection, was in full force during the pendency of the proceedings complained of, at the time of the filing of this petition, and is still unrevoked. While we do not admit that any legislation of Congress was needed to sustain this proclamation of the President, it being clearly within his power, as commander-in-chief, to issue it; yet, if it is asserted that legislative action is necessary to give validity to it, Congress has seen fit to expressly ratify the proclamation by the act of March 3d, 1863, by declaring that the President, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, and in any part thereof. The offences for which the petitioner for the purpose of this hearing is confessed to be guilty, are the offences enumerated in this proclamation. The prison in which he is confined is a "military prison" therein mentioned. As to him, his acts and imprisonment, the writ of habeas corpus is expressly suspended. Apparently admitting by his petition that a military commission *17 might have jurisdiction in certain cases, the petitioner seeks to except himself by alleging that he is a citizen of Indiana, and has never been in the naval or military service of the United States, or since the commencement of the Rebellion a resident of a rebel State, and that, therefore, it had been out of his power to have acquired belligerent rights and to have placed himself in such a relation to the government as to enable him to violate the laws of war. But neither residence nor propinquity to the field of actual hostilities is the test to determine who is or who is not subject to martial law, even in a time of foreign war, and certainly not in a time of civil insurrection. The commander-in-chief has full power to make an effectual use of his forces. He must, therefore, have power to arrest and punish one who arms men to join the enemy in the field against him; one who holds correspondence with that enemy; one who is an officer of an armed force organized to oppose him; one who is preparing to seize arsenals and release prisoners of war taken in battle and confined within his military lines. These crimes of the petitioner were committed within the State of Indiana, where his arrest, trial, and imprisonment took place; within a military district of a geographical military department, duly established by the commander-in-chief; within the military lines of the army, and upon the theatre of military operations; in a State which had been and was then threatened with invasion, having arsenals which the petitioner plotted to seize, and prisoners of war whom he plotted to liberate; where citizens were liable to be made soldiers, and were actually ordered into the ranks; and to prevent whose becoming soldiers the petitioner conspired with and armed others. Thus far the discussion has proceeded without reference to the effect of the Constitution upon war-making powers, duties, and rights, save to that provision which makes the President commander-in-chief of the armies and navies. Does the Constitution provide restraint upon the exercise of this power? *18 The people of every sovereign State possess all the rights and powers of government. The people of these States in forming a "more perfect Union, to insure domestic tranquillity, and to provide for the common defence," have vested the power of making and carrying on war in the general government, reserving to the States, respectively, only the right to repel invasion and suppress insurrection "of such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." This right and power thus granted to the general government is in its nature entirely executive, and in the absence of constitutional limitations would be wholly lodged in the President, as chief executive officer and commander-in-chief of the armies and navies. Lest this grant of power should be so broad as to tempt its exercise in initiating war, in order to reap the fruits of victory, and, therefore, be unsafe to be vested in a single branch of a republican government, the Constitution has delegated to Congress the power of originating war by declaration, when such declaration is necessary to the commencement of hostilities, and of provoking it by issuing letters of marque and reprisal; consequently, also, the power of raising and supporting armies, maintaining a navy, employing the militia, and of making rules for the government of all armed forces while in the service of the United States. To keep out of the hands of the Executive the fruits of victory, Congress is also invested with the power to "make rules for the disposition of captures by land or water." After war is originated, whether by declaration, invasion, or insurrection, the whole power of conducting it, as to manner, and as to all the means and appliances by which war is carried on by civilized nations, is given to the President. He is the sole judge of the exigencies, necessities, and duties of the occasion, their extent and duration. [*] During the war his powers must be without limit, because, if defending, the means of offence may be nearly illimitable; *19 or, if acting offensively, his resources must be proportionate to the end in view, — "to conquer a peace." New difficulties are constantly arising, and new combinations are at once to be thwarted, which the slow movement of legislative action cannot meet. [*] These propositions are axiomatic in the absence of all restraining legislation by Congress. Much of the argument on the side of the petitioner will rest, perhaps, upon certain provisions — not in the Constitution itself, and as originally made, but now seen in the Amendments made in 1789: the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. They may as well be here set out: 4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 5. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. 6. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, ... . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. In addition to these, there are two preceding amendments *20 which we may also mention, to wit: the second and third. They are thus: 2. A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 3. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law. It will be argued that the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles, as above given, are restraints upon the war-making power; but we deny this. All these amendments are in pari materiâ and if either is a restraint upon the President in carrying on war, in favor of the citizen, it is difficult to see why all of them are not. Yet will it be argued that the fifth article would be violated in "depriving of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," armed rebels marching to attack the capital? Or that the fourth would be violated by searching and seizing the papers and houses of persons in open insurrection and war against the government? It cannot properly be so argued, any more than it could be that it was intended by the second article (declaring that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed") to hinder the President from disarming insurrectionists, rebels, and traitors in arms while he was carrying on war against them. These, in truth, are all peace provisions of the Constitution, and, like all other conventional and legislative laws and enactments, are silent amidst arms, and when the safety of the people becomes the supreme law. By the Constitution, as originally adopted, no limitations were put upon the war-making and war-conducting powers of Congress and the President; and after discussion, and after the attention of the country was called to the subject, no other limitation by subsequent amendment has been made, except by the Third Article, which prescribes that "no soldier shall be quartered in any house in time of peace *21 without consent of the owner, or in time of war, except in a manner prescribed by law." This, then, is the only expressed constitutional restraint upon the President as to the manner of carrying on war. There would seem to be no implied one; on the contrary, while carefully providing for the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in time of peace, the Constitution takes it for granted that it will be suspended "in case of rebellion or invasion (i.e., in time of war), when the public safety requires it." The second and third sections of the act relating to habeas corpus, of March 3d, 1863, apply only to those persons who are held as "state or political offenders," and not to those who are held as prisoners of war. The petitioner was as much a prisoner of war as if he had been taken in action with arms in his hands. They apply, also, only to those persons, the cause of whose detention is not disclosed; and not to those who, at the time when the lists by the provisions of said sections are to be furnished to the court, are actually undergoing trial before military tribunals upon written charges made against them. The law was framed to prevent imprisonment for an indefinite time without trial, not to interfere with the case of prisoners undergoing trial. Its purpose was to make it certain that such persons should be tried. Notwithstanding, therefore, the act of March 3, 1863, the commission had jurisdiction, and properly tried the prisoner. The petitioner does not complain that he has been kept in ignorance of the charges against him, or that the investigation of those charges has been unduly delayed. Finally, if the military tribunal has no jurisdiction, the petitioner may be held as a prisoner of war, aiding with arms the enemies of the United States, and held, under the authority of the United States, until the war terminates, then to be handed over by the military to the civil authorities, to be tried for his crimes under the acts of Congress, and before the courts which he has selected. *22 ON THE SIDE OF THE PETITIONER. Mr. David Dudley Field: Certain topics have been brought into this discussion which have no proper place in it, and which I shall endeavor to keep out of it. This is not a question of the discipline of camps; it is not a question of the government of armies in the field; it is not a question respecting the power of a conqueror over conquered armies or conquered states. It is not a question, how far the legislative department of the government can deal with the question of martial rule. Whatever has been done in these cases, has been done by the executive department alone. Nor is it a question of the patriotism, or the character, or the services of the late chief magistrate, or of his constitutional advisers. It is a question of the rights of the citizen in time of war. Is it true, that the moment a declaration of war is made, the executive department of this government, without an act of Congress, becomes absolute master of our liberties and our lives? Are we, then, subject to martial rule, administered by the President upon his own sense of the exigency, with nobody to control him, and with every magistrate and every authority in the land subject to his will alone? These are the considerations which give to the case its greatest significance. But we are met with the preliminary objection, that you cannot consider it for want of JURISDICTION. The objection is twofold: first, that the Circuit Court of Indiana had not jurisdiction to hear the case there presented; and, second, that this court has not jurisdiction to hear and decide the questions thus certified. First. As to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. That depended on the fourteenth section of the Judiciary Act of *23 1789, and on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863. The former was, in Bollman's case, [*] held to authorize the courts, as well as the judges, to issue the writ for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment. The act of March 3d, 1863, after providing that the Secretaries of State and of War shall furnish to the judges of the Circuit and District Courts a list of political and state prisoners, and of all others, except prisoners of war, goes on to declare, that if a grand jury has had a session, and has adjourned without finding an indictment, thereupon "it shall be the duty of the judge of said court forthwith to make an order, that any such prisoner desiring a discharge from said imprisonment be brought before him to be discharged." Upon this act the objection is, first, that the application of the petitioner should have been made to one of the judges of the circuit, instead of the court itself; and, second, that the petition does not show whether it was made under the second or the third section. To the former objection the answer is, first, that the decision in Bollman's case, just mentioned, covers this case; for the same reasoning which gives the court power to proceed under the fourteenth section of the act of 1789, gives the court power to proceed under the second and third sections of the act of 1863. The second answer is that, by the provisos of the second section, the court is expressly mentioned as having the power. The other objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is, that the petition does not show under which section of the act it was presented. It states that the petitioner is held a prisoner under the authority of the President; that a term has been held, and that a grand jury has been in attendance, and has adjourned without indicting. It does not state whether a list has been furnished to the judges by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, and, therefore, argues the learned counsel, the court has no jurisdiction. That is to say, the judges, knowing themselves whether the *24 list has, or has not been furnished, cannot proceed, because we have not told them by our petition what they already know, and what we ourselves might not know, and perhaps could not know, because the law does not make it necessary that the list shall be filed, or that anybody shall be informed of it but the judges. Second. As to the jurisdiction of this court. Supposing the Circuit Court to have had jurisdiction, has this court jurisdiction to hear these questions as they are certified? There are various objections. It is said that a division of opinion can be certified only in a cause, and that this is not a cause. It was decided by this court, in Holmes v. Jennison, [*] that a proceeding on habeas corpus is a suit, and suit is a more comprehensive word than cause. The argument is, that it is not a cause until the adverse party comes in. Is not a suit commenced before the defendant is brought into court? Is the defendant's appearance the first proceeding in a cause? There have been three acts in respect to this writ of habeas corpus. The first of 1789; then the act passed in 1833; and, finally, the act of 1842. The last act expressly designates the proceeding as a cause. Another objection is, that there must be parties; that is, at least two parties, and that here is only one. This argument is derived from the direction in the act, that the point must be stated "upon the request of either party" or their counsel. It is said that "either party" imports two, and if there are not two, there can be no certificate. This is too literal: "qui hœret in litera hæet in cortice." The language is elliptical. What is meant is, "any party or parties, his or their counsel." Again: "either," if precisely used, would exclude all over two, because "either" strictly means "one of two;" and if there are three parties or more, as there may be, you cannot have a certificate. It is not unusual, in proceedings in rem, to have several intervenors and claimants: what are we to do then? The answer must be, that "either" is an equivalent word for "any;" and that whoever *25 may happen to be a party, whether he stand alone or with others, may ask for the certificate. The words "either party" were introduced, not for restriction but enlargement. The purpose was to enable any party to bring the case here; otherwise it might have been argued, perhaps, that all parties must join in asking for the certificate. The purpose of the act was to prevent a failure of justice, when the two judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion. The reason of the rule is as applicable to a case with one party as if there were two. Whether a question shall be certified to this court, depends upon the point in controversy. If it concerns a matter of right, and not of discretion, there is as much reason for its being sent ex parte as for its being sent inter partes. This very case is an illustration. Here a writ is applied for, or an order is asked. The judges do not agree about the issue of the writ, or the granting of the order. Upon their action the lives of these men depend. Shall there be a failure of justice? The question presented to the Circuit Court was not merely a formal one; whether an initial writ should issue. It is the practice, upon petitions for habeas corpus, to consider whether, upon the facts presented, the prisoners, if brought up, would be remanded. The presentation of the petition brings before the court, at the outset, the merits, to a certain extent, of the whole case. That was the course pursued in Passmore Williamson's case; [*] in Rex v. Ennis; [†] in the case of the Three Spanish Sailors; [‡] in Hobhouse's case; [§] in Husted's case; [†] and in Ferguson's case; [¶] and in this court, in Watkins's case, [**] where the disposition of the case turned upon the point whether, if the writ were issued, the petitioner would be remanded upon the facts as they appeared. There may, indeed, be cases where only one party can appear, that are at first and must always remain ex parte. *26 Here, however, there were, in fact, two parties. Who were they? The record tells us: "Be it remembered, that on the 10th day of May, A.D. 1865, in the court aforesaid, before the judges aforesaid, comes Jonathan W. Gordon, Esq., of counsel for said Milligan, and files here in open court the petition of said Milligan to be discharged. At the same time comes, also, John Hanna, Esq., the attorney prosecuting the pleas of the United States in this behalf. And thereupon, by agreement, this application is submitted to the court, and day is given," &c. The next day the case came on again, and the certificate was made. In point of fact, therefore, this cause had all the solemnity which two parties could give it. The government came into court, and submitted the case in Indiana, for the very purpose of having it brought to Washington. A still additional objection made to the jurisdiction of this court is, that no questions can be certified except those which arise upon the trial. The answer is, first, that there has been a trial, in its proper sense, as applicable to this case. The facts are all before the court. A return could not vary them. The case has been heard upon the petition, as if that contained all that need be known, or could be known. The practice is not peculiar to habeas corpus; it is the same on application for mandamus, or for attachments in cases of contempt; in both which cases the court sometimes hears the whole matter on the first motion, and sometimes postpones it till formal pleadings are put in. In either case, the result is the same. But, secondly, if it were not so, is it correct to say that a certificate can only be made upon a trial? To sustain this position, the counsel refers to the case of Davis v. Burden. [*] But that case expressly reserves the question. It is admitted that the question of jurisdiction is a question that may be certified. The qualification insisted upon is, *27 that no question can be certified unless it arose upon the trial of the cause, or be a question of jurisdiction. This is a question of jurisdiction. It is a question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to grant the writ of habeas corpus, and to liberate these men; and that question brings up all the other questions in the cause. Yet another objection to the jurisdiction of this court is, that the case must be one in which the answer to the questions when given shall be final; that is to say, the questions come here to be finally decided. What does that mean? Does it mean that the same thing can never be debated again? Certainly not. It means that the decision shall be final for the two judges who certified the difference of opinion, so that when the answer goes down from this court they shall act according to its order, as if they had originally decided in the same way. Another objection to the jurisdiction of this court is, that the whole case is certified. The answer is, that no question is certified except those which actually arose before the court at the time, and without considering which it could not move at all. That is the first answer. The second is, that if too much is certified, the court will divide the questions, and answer only those which it finds to be properly certified, as it did in the Silliman v. Hudson River Bridge Company [*] case. The last objection to the jurisdiction of this court is, that the case is ended; because, it is to be presumed that these unfortunate men have been hanged. Is it to be presumed that any executive officer of this country, though he arrogate to himself this awful power of military government, would venture to put to death three men, who claim that they are unjustly convicted, and whose case is considered of such gravity by the Circuit Court of the United States that it certifies the question to the Supreme Court? The suggestion is disrespectful to the executive, and I am glad to believe that it has no foundation in fact. *28 All the objections, then, are answered. There is nothing, then, in the way of proceeding to II. THE MERITS AND MAIN QUESTION. The argument upon the questions naturally divides itself into two parts: First. Was the military commission a competent tribunal for the trial of the petitioners upon the charges upon which they were convicted and sentenced? Second. If it was not a competent tribunal, could the petitioners be released by the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, upon writs of habeas corpus or otherwise? The discussion of the competency of the military commission is first in order, because, if the petitioners were lawfully tried and convicted, it is useless to inquire how they could be released from an unlawful imprisonment. If, on the other hand, the tribunal was incompetent, and the conviction and sentence nullities, then the means of relief become subjects of inquiry, and involve the following considerations: 1. Does the power of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus appertain to all the great departments of government concurrently, or to some only, and which of them? 2. If the power is concurrent, can its exercise by the executive or judicial department be restrained or regulated by act of Congress? 3. If the power appertains to Congress alone, or if Congress may control its exercise by the other departments, has that body so exercised its functions as to leave to the petitioners the privilege of the writ, or to entitle them to their discharge? In considering the first question, that of the competency of the military tribunal for the trial of the petitioners upon those charges, let me first call attention to the dates of the transactions. Let it be observed next, that for the same offences as those *29 set forth in the charges and specifications, the petitioners could have been tried and punished by the ordinary civil tribunals. Let it also be remembered, that Indiana, at the time of this trial, was a peaceful State; the courts were all open; their processes had not been interrupted; the laws had their full sway. Then let it be remembered that the petitioners were simple citizens, not belonging to the army or navy; not in any official position; not connected in any manner with the public service. The evidence against them is not to be found in this record, and it is immaterial. Their guilt or their innocence does not affect the question of the competency of the tribunal by which they were judged. Bearing in mind, therefore, the nature of the charges, and the time of the trial and sentence; bearing in mind, also, the presence and undisputed authority of the civil tribunals and the civil condition of the petitioners, we ask by what authority they were withdrawn from their natural judges? What is a military commission? Originally, it appears to have been an advisory board of officers, convened for the purpose of informing the conscience of the commanding officer, in cases where he might act for himself if he chose. General Scott resorted to it in Mexico for his assistance in governing conquered places. The first mention of it in an act of Congress appears to have been in the act of July 22, 1861, where the general commanding a separate department, or a detached army, was authorized to appoint a military board, or commission, of not less than three, or more than five officers, to examine the qualifications and conduct of commissioned officers of volunteers. Subsequently, military commissions are mentioned in four acts of Congress, but in none of them is any provision made for their organization, regulation, or jurisdiction, further than that it is declared that in time of war or rebellion, spies may be tried by a general court-martial or military commission; and that "persons who are in the military service of *30 the United States, and subject to the Articles of War," may also be tried by the same, for murder, and certain other infamous crimes. These acts do not confer upon military commissions jurisdiction over any persons other than those in the military service and spies. There being, then, no act of Congress for the establishment of the commission, it depended entirely upon the executive will for its creation and support. This brings up the true question now before the court: Has the President, in time of war, upon his own mere will and judgment, the power to bring before his military officers any person in the land, and subject him to trial and punishment, even to death? The proposition is stated in this form, because it really amounts to this. If the President has this awful power, whence does he derive it? He can exercise no authority whatever but that which the Constitution of the country gives him. Our system knows no authority beyond or above the law. We may, therefore, dismiss from our minds every thought of the President's having any prerogative, as representative of the people, or as interpreter of the popular will. He is elected by the people to perform those functions, and those only, which the Constitution of his country, and the laws made pursuant to that Constitution, confer. The plan of argument which I propose is, first to examine the text of the Constitution. That instrument, framed with the greatest deliberation, after thirteen years' experience of war and peace, should be accepted as the authentic and final expression of the public judgment, regarding that form and scope of government, and those guarantees of private rights, which legal science, political philosophy, and the experience of previous times had taught as the safest and most perfect. All attempts to explain it away, or to evade or pervert it, should be discountenanced and resisted. Beyond the line of such an argument, everything else ought, in strictness, to be superfluous. But, I shall endeavor to show, further, that the theory of our government, for which I am contending, *31 is the only one compatible with civil liberty; and, by what I may call an historical argument, that this theory is as old as the nation, and that even in the constitutional monarchies of England and France that notion of executive power, which would uphold military commissions, like the one against which I am speaking, has never been admitted. What are the powers and attributes of the presidential office? They are written in the second article of the Constitution, and, so far as they relate to the present question, they are these: He is vested with the "executive power;" he is "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States;" he is to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed;" and he takes this oath: "I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States." The "executive power" mentioned in the Constitution is the executive power of the United States. The President is not clothed with the executive power of the States. He is not clothed with any executive power, except as he is specifically directed by some other part of the Constitution, or by an act of Congress. He is to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." He is to execute the laws by the means and in the manner which the laws themselves prescribe. The oath of office cannot be considered as a grant of power. Its effect is merely to superadd a religious sanction to what would otherwise be his official duty, and to bind his conscience against any attempt to usurp power or overthrow the Constitution. There remains, then, but a single clause to discuss, and that is the one which makes him commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the States when called into the federal service. The question, therefore, is narrowed down to this: Does the authority to command an army carry with it authority to arrest and *32 try by court-martial civilians — by which I mean persons not in the martial forces; not impressed by law with a martial character? The question is easily answered. To command an army, whether in camp, or on the march, or in battle, requires the control of no other persons than the officers, soldiers, and camp followers. It can hardly be contended that, if Congress neglects to find subsistence, the commander-in-chief may lawfully take it from our own citizens. It cannot be supposed that, if Congress fails to provide the means of recruiting, the commander-in-chief may lawfully force the citizens into the ranks. What is called the war power of the President, if indeed there be any such thing, is nothing more than the power of commanding the armies and fleets which Congress causes to be raised. To command them is to direct their operations. Much confusion of ideas has been produced by mistaking executive power for kingly power. Because in monarchial countries the kingly office includes the executive, it seems to have been sometimes inferred that, conversely, the executive carries with it the kingly prerogative. Our executive is in no sense a king, even for four years. So much for that article of the Constitution, the second, which creates and regulates the executive power. If we turn to the other portions of the original instrument (I do not now speak of the amendments) the conclusion already drawn from the second article will be confirmed, if there be room for confirmation. Thus, in the first article, Congress is authorized "to declare war, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;" "to raise and support armies;" "to provide and maintain a navy;" "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;" "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;" "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and governing such part of them as may be in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed *33 by Congress;" "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over ... . all places purchased ... . for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards;" "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the ... . powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." These various provisions of the first article would show, if there were any doubt upon the construction of the second, that the powers of the President do not include the power to raise or support an army, or to provide or maintain a navy, or to call forth the militia, to repel an invasion, or to suppress an insurrection, or execute the laws, or even to govern such portions of the militia as are called into the service of the United States, or to make law for any of the forts, magazines, arsenals, or dock-yards. If the President could not, even in flagrant war, except as authorized by Congress, call forth the militia of Indiana to repel an invasion of that State, or, when called, g